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INTRODUCTION
This Court must act to correct a disastrous mistake in
setting aside valid unanimous jury verdicts which defined the
improper, fraudulent and conspiratorial acts of an attorney,
based upon compelling and undisputed evidence presented at trial.
While we appreciate its efforts to arrive at a reasonable opinion
based upon Sua Sponte

investigation, several findings of the

court do not stand up to closer scrutiny and demand further
review. To dispute the jury in the manner the court now
contemplates would amount to a travesty of justice. We therefore
ask the Court to invest a little more time and effort to get to
the truth of the matter.
Pro-Se Defendant/Appellees Del K. Bartel, Dale Thurgood and
Lee Allen Bartel hereby submit their petition for rehearing of
the appeal and cross appeal as designated above pursuant to Rule
35 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendants state that this
petition is presented in good faith and is not interposed for
delay and rely upon the following facts and points of law that
they assert the court must further consider;
MATERIAL FACTS
1.

This appeal/cross appeal stems from case No. C86-553 in

the Third District Court wherein a unanimous jury rendered its
decision on June 20, 1990, under a special verdicts form, that
plaintiffs Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry were guilty of breach
of contract, active interference, two separate counts of fraud
and conspiracy to defraud as against defendants.
1

2.

That plaintiffs received an award in this action in

light of a directed verdict ordered by that court based upon a
Masters Panel Report dated May 18, 1990 as created pursuant to a
stipulated settlement agreement stemming from a bifurcated trial
on plaintiffs masonry and related structural claims in February,
1990.
3.

On or about July 1, 1994 the Supreme Court rendered its

opinion wherein it basically denied the appeal and cross appeals
of the parties with the exception of setting aside the directed
verdict of the court and the jury's findings of fraud and
conspiracy as against the DeBrys.

ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE PREVAILING PARTY ISSUE
IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
While this court declined to rule on the issue of prevailing
party under the cross appeal, based upon the assertion that
defendants do not claim they raised this issue below nor could
the court find any indication that they did so, (opinion at 15)
such is not the case. The prevailing party issue was raised as
follows:
1,

Defendants specifically addressed the issue below under

the Reply To Plaintiffs Motion To Clarify, Alter Or Amend
Judgement And For Final Ruling Upon Defendants Post Trial Motions
Point V, dated April 22,1991. (p 13149 - 13158, Exhibit A)
2

2.

This matter was argued at hearing in the District Court

on May 5, 1991. (Exhibit B. - transcript of hearing pages 2-14,
46,47)
3.

Appellees notice of appeal dated June 18, 1991 included

a copy of the judgment wherein this issue was referenced at
paragraph 5. (Ref Appellate Court Record)
4.

Defendants docketing statement dated July 9, 1991 and

amended docketing statement dated September 20, 1991 at paragraph
3(e) cite the claim that the District Court erroneously refused
to designate defendants as the prevailing party in this case.
(Ref - Appel Ct. Record)
5.

Plaintiffs have failed to contest or dispute defendants

prevailing party claims, as made under point V of appellees
brief, nor did they contend this issue is presented for the first
time on appeal because they were acutely aware of the fact that
this issue was raised, argued and erroneously
The defendants are the prevailing party

ruled upon below.

in this case and the

jury verdict and applicable case law demands that ruling.
POINT II
KENNETH KARREN JR.'S TESTIMONY
WAS CLEARLY INADMISSIBLE
The matter involving Kenneth Karren Jr.'s testimony rendered
on behalf of the DeBrys has been relegated to a vacuous footnote
(No. 7 at p. 15) in the Court's opinion. The issue of "Bill
Karrens"1 inadmissible testimony as submitted at trial must be
reviewed for the following reasons:
1.

Defendants submitted argument under point III of
3

appellees brief at 37-40 and section III point X of appellees
reply brief in support of their contentions.
2.

Specific citations to the trial transcript and exhibits

submitted at trial factually prove that Karren

Jr. falsely

testified as a licensed contractor at trial, then falsely held
himself out as the agent of a licensed contractor, subsequently
submitting an invalid bid for repair of alleged defects at trial.
(Ref tr. 815f 816f 825, 842-845, 900, 934-935, documents - app
brief 1(1), 1(2), 2(21), 2(22))
3.

Kenneth Karren Jr., as a Masters Panel member and

judicial officer (See Plumb v. State 809 P. 2d at 734), appointed
pursuant to Rule 53 Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, should have
distanced himself from exparte actions such as preparing the bid
for repairs as a licensed contractor for the DeBrys in the same
action, (plaintiffs only submitted evidence under their
theoretical costs of repair). Defendants further reference Rule
605 Rules Of Evidence in this regard.
4.

These issues were raised under defendants motion and

memorandum in the lower court on January 14, 1991. (Ref 12936 12986) Based upon the facts of the matter the court must find
that Karren Jr.'s testimony was inadmissible and set aside any
award stemming therefrom.
POINT III
SETTING ASIDE OP THE DIRECTED VERDICT
ELIMINATES ANY DEBRY AWARD
This opinion properly set aside the trial courts directed
verdict but failed to fully apply that correct decision. The
4

court will note that the jury found that defendants were not
negligent in the construction of the building. (Sp. ver. No. 1)
Defendants did not breach the implied warranty of good
workmanship (4b) the express warranty that the building would be
free from defects (4c) the express warranty of occupancy (4d) the
implied warranty of habitability (4e) and implied warranty of
fitness for intended purpose (4f).
Under the auspices of the erroneous directed verdict the
jury was forced to find that defendants failed to construct the
building according to the requirements of the Uniform Building
Code. (4a, 16, 17, 18) Plaintiffs only awards, under the related
breakdown of categories of repair include the following schedule;
Masonry - $30,000, West stair - $675, Architectural - $7,000,
miscellaneous - $10,000 (sp. ver. para. 18). The architectural
award of $7,000 and miscellaneous award of $10,000 do not involve
Uniform Building Code violations. Once the masonry and related
structural claims have been removed pursuant to the February 1990
Stipulated Settlement Agreement, no resultant damage claim
remains. (Defendants would further assert that Architectural
matters were addressed in that Settlement Agreement as well. See
Appl. Brf. - 2(12))
POINT IV
THIS COURT MUST ADDRESS THE MASTERS PANEL ISSUE
Defendants dispute the Supreme Courts' failure to address
issues directly involving the May 18, 1990 Masters Panel Report
issued pursuant to Rule 53 Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure (App.
5

Brf. - Section II - 2(d)). With virtually no definitive Utah case
law on the books in regard to Rule 53 and in light of the
plaintiff/attorney's wrongful actions, it is incumbent upon the
court to rule in regard to the DeBrys secret preparation of the
Masters Panel Report as submitted at trial (App 2(13), 2(14)),
DeBrys exparte communications with the panel (App 2(13), 2(14),
the fact that one panel member testified he was prevented by the
DeBrys from completing his work (App. 2(18), 2(20)), the fact
that DeBry paid off the other two panel members himself (App.
2(17)), the fact that the remaining two members under DeBrys
direction later unilaterally provided a second report replacing
the first report (App. 2(19)), the fact that the panel acted
outside the scope of the reference (App. 2(12), 2(19)) and that a
master (licensed engineer) offered his bid and testimony as a
licensed contractor, as a paid witness, on behalf of the DeBrys
at trial. This issue was presented to the trial court in post
trial motions (R. 12939 - 12986) and on appeal (Appl Brf. Pt.
Ill, Appl. Rep. Brf. at pt. X) and calls for the courts
definative review.
POINT V
THE COURTS FINDINGS IN REGARD TO THE
FRAUD, CONSPIRACY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGE AWARDS ARE MADE IN ERROR
The defendants take issue with the courts opinion in regard
to the fraud and conspiracy counts and the punitive damage award
as rendered by the jury and as upheld by the court and emphasize
the following points:
6

1.

Initially, the issues pertaining to the fraud and

conspiracy findings of the jury are not properly before this
court. Plaintiffs failed to ever present any objection or
argument in reference to these charges prior to trial, at trial
or in post trial motions. Further, plaintiffs did not oppose
these findings at trial when the verdicts were read and allowed
the jury to be dismissed without objection. Plaintiffs
misrepresented the facts when they declared that objections were
rendered in this regard under post trial motions at R 11505-29
and 11791-916.

Careful review of those pleading reflects the

facts that fraud and conspiracy issues were not mentioned as an
issue contestedI (Exhibit C and D) Defendants previously
referenced that fact (Appl rply brf - section I point 1) but this
argument was apparently overlooked or ignored. Defendants further
rely upon facts and case law cited under appellees' brief - Point
II, Point III, Appl. reply brief - sections I - Point 4,5,8.
2.

Even if the court could somehow construe DeBrys'

pleading as valid underlying objections to the fraud and
conspiracy verdicts, under plaintiffs motions for a verdict and
judgment n.o.v., (11505-11529 and 11791-11916) these matters are
not properly before the court due to the acknowledged fact that
the DeBrys failed to marshall the evidence as is required to even
consider overturning these jury verdicts.
3.

Due to the fact that plaintiffs failed to properly

marshall all the evidence concerning the fraud and conspiracy
findings, and the fact that all the evidence was not before this
7

court, it must modify its evaluation of these jury verdicts as
follows;
A*

The court mistakenly concludes that defendants failed

to rely upon Debrys' misrepresentations to their detriment in
charging the defendants with defective work that was done by
someone else. That conclusion is in error. Based upon DeBrys'
insistence that defendants subcontractors and or employees
performed defective work on the building, defendants agreed to
the scheduling and management order of the court (R. 4742-4746)
voluntarily reentered the building in the fall of 1987, paid for
new building permits, revised plans, new engineering
specifications (in conjunction with Salt Lake County engineers
and inspectors and DeBry engineers) to address every defect
verified and found in the building. Defendants incurred
$27,719.81 (Exhibit E) in direct costs in this performance, in
reliance upon DeBrys false assertions that defendants employees
and or subcontractors were responsible for a substantial number
of defects in the building. (Tr. 1560-1563 and 790-796 Exhibit F)
Defendants paid for the resolution of every defect found at that
time, with the exception of two matters DeBrys refused to allow
correction of - wire glass windows/parapet wall - or set back
problems. (R 5070- 5073)
These facts were presented at trial in 1990 (Tr. 770, 771,
793-796, 1172-1176,1151-1153, 1081, 1560-163; trial Exhibits
(247, AAA) The jury weighed

this strong evidence in making its

factual determinations and found that defendants relied upon
8

DeBrys' false representations concerning cited defects to
defendants damage and detriment and this court cannot properly
substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of the finder
of fact. Defendants further note that the trial courts' judgment,
in absence of clear and specific facts supporting abuse of
discretion, cannot be challenged. Barber v. Calder 522 P. 2d at
700; Donohue v. Intermtn Health Care, Inc. 748 P. 2d 1067 (Utah
1987)
Defendants specifically reference Conder v. A. L. Williams &
Associates, 739 p. 2d 634 (Utah App. 1987) in regard to the
element of reliance wherein the court again found that reliance
must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and
it is usually a question for the jury to determine. See Berkeley
Bank for Coops, v. Meibos, 607 p. 2d 798, 801 (Utah 1980)
Although it is impossible to draw precise legal boundaries of
when reliance is reasonable the courts have given some direction.
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 p. 2d 134, 137 (1945)
Generally, a plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive
assertions of fact without independent investigation. See Dugan
v. Jones. 615 p. 2d 1237, 1247 (Utah 1980) Prosser & Keeton, The
Law of Torts. 108, at 749-54 (5th Ed. 1984)

It is apparent that DeBrys actions constitute innovative and
unusual fraudulent conduct. In this instance plaintiffs take
advantage of Robert J. DeBrys position in the community as an
attorney and owner of a large law firm to use litigation and to
some degree the court to perpetrate this fraudulent and
9

conspiratorial behavior. These actions are addressed in part as
follows:
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the multi-farious
means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to
in order to gain an advantage over another. In its general
or generic sense, it comprises all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty
and resulting in damage to another.
37 C.J.S. Fraud s 1
B.

The court also misconstrues the jury's second fraud

finding. While the court characterizes this verdict as concerning
"payments due under the note" the jury verdict actually found
that plaintiffs conspired to defraud defendants of payments due
(sp. ver. 31) and that plaintiffs fraudulent action was a
proximate cause of damage to the defendants, (sp. ver. 32)
Evidence provided at trial addressed all nine (9) elements
of fraud. (Ref Appl. Brf. Point V, Appl. Rply. Brf. - points
XIII, IX) Evidence was presented showing that as part of the sale
more than $152,858 of defendants proceeds were placed in escrow,
pursuant to the closing documents. (Exhibit G) at the time of
sale and after to facilitate the taking of these monies. Witness
David Jorgensen admitted at trial wrongful actions performed in
concert with plaintiffs involving the plan or scheme to take
defendants escrowed funds (1364 -1365, 1401-1408, 1413-1414)
including the fabrication and implementation of a false document
designed to take defendant's escrow, expand the litigation and
sue Utah Title and Abstract Company and later Fidelity National
Title Co, (Tr. 1364-1365, 1401-1406) with the DeBrys ultimately
filing suit against Jorgensen himself to shut him up. (Tr. 140410

1408, 1413-1414) Evidence was presented to show that DeBrys'
actions, including the filing of false, misleading and contrived
documents at closing and after to promote the issuance of the
complaint (R. 4760-4899) in order to assert wrongful claims
against monies due defendants, which defendants have not yet
received due to DeBrys ongoing claims against escrow in the
bankrupcy court. (Exhibit H) (This courts comment concerning the
jury's finding that plaintiffs did not conspire to file a lawsuit
before the closing (Sp. Ver. 33) is a distinct and separate claim
irrelevant to the courts findings under special verdicts 31 and
32.)
C.

The courts opinion concerning punitive damages also

disregards the jury's finding of intentional active interference
against the DeBrys (verdicts 26, 27 - sp ver. form, App 2(11))
which constitutes negligent action sounding in tort. The fact
that the DeBry's were found to have knowingly and willfully
proceeded to interfere further reflects blatant and
unconscionable tortious conduct, in and of itself justifying the
punitive damage award. This jury verdict is also not before the
court, was not designated on appeal and precludes this court from
setting aside the punitive damage award.
The other test that is not addressed or demonstrated by
plaintiffs is that reasonable persons could not have concluded as
the jury in reaching its decision. DeBry v. Hilton Travel
Services, Inc. v. Capital Intern. Airways. Inc.. 555p.2d 201 874
(Utah 1976); Nuhn v. Broadbent. 507 p.2d 371 (Utah 1973)
11

POINT VI
THE COURT'S OPINION CITES OTHER
MATTERS THAT CALL FOR COMPLETION
Due at least in part to the parties lack of guidance through
more than 13,500 pages of the trial record, ten volumes of trial
transcript and as a result of eight and one half years of
protracted litigation, this court has drawn partial conclusions
that call for completion.
The Court recognizes DeBrys litigious actions (Opinion at
p.3) but fails to acknowledge the full nature and extent of his
wrongful conduct. The DeBrys intentional misrepresentations are
confirmed, but all the facts governing the frauds are not fully
analyzed. (Opinion at 6) The Court understands the DeBry attacked
the jury verdicts without marshalling the but fails to apply this
fact to each jury challenge. (Opinion p. 9 para. 1, Footnote 3
p.9) The aforementioned facts and evidence as referenced under
points I through V should assist this Court in bringing this
matter to a proper conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Historically, every appellate court in this country, and
more particularly the Utah Supreme Court, is charged with the
duty, where there has been a full trial of the issues, and the
trial court has made findings and entered judgment thereon, to
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may have
been fairly drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
jury's findings, the judgment, and the contentions of the
prevailing party. Where conflicts exist the court must consider
12

as true, the evidence that supports the verdict and the court
will not substitute its evaluation of the evidence for that of
the jury.
Review of the lower court record clearly reflects the fact
that the issues involving

prevailing party, the inadmissible

testimony of Kenneth Karren Jr. and the invalid Masters Panel
Report were submitted and ruled upon and are properly before this
court.
On the other hand issues involving fraud and conspiracy were
never addressed below, and even if they had been plaintiffs
failed to properly marshall all the evidence in order for the
court to give those matters complete and thorough consideration.
The tort of intentional active interference, an unchallenged
finding against the DeBrys not before this court, in and of
itself precludes the vacating of the punitive damage award.
While the court did find that the courts directed verdict
should be set aside it must carry that finding to its logical
conclusion.... that DeBrys ultimately receive no award.
We therefore ask this court to re-evaluate these narrow
issues and modify its opinion in light of the appellate court
rules that apply, the evidence submitted at trial, the applicable
case law, the jury verdict, the judgment and the "actual facts"
if the case as opposed to the distorted representations of the
DeBrys and ultimately due to the fact that we were the prevailing
party in this litigation. Any other prospect would serve to
substantially deny defendant/appellees of their rights of due
13

Respectfully submitted this /J .—-day of July# 1994.

DEL K. BARTEL

DALE TH

LEE A. BARTEL
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P.O. Box 57 2 34
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Attorneys Pro Se for Defendants
Cascade Enterprises, Cascade
Construction, Del K. Bartel
Dale Thurgood and Lee Allan Bartel

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DeBRY and
JOAN DeBRY,
Plaintiffs ,
vs .

CASCADE DEFENDANTS' REPLY
TO PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO CLARIFY, ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT AND FOR FINAL
RULING UPON DEFENDANTS'
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Civil No.

C86-553

Defendants.
Honorable Pat B. Brian
Defendants Del K. Bartel and Dale Thurgood, individually,
and as to their respective partnership interest in Cascade
Enterprises and Cascade Construction, and Lee Allan Bartel,
individually, and as to his partnership interest in Cascade
Construction, hereinafter referred to as "Cascade defendants",
hereby offer the following response to plaintiff Robert J.
DeBry's memorandum, proposed judgment and plaintiff's letters
dated April 16, 1991:

PERTINENT FACTS
The following additional facts specifically controvert
representations made by plaintiffs.
1.

Evidence produced at trial established the following:
(a)

There was no owner/contractor relationship between

plaintiffs and Cascade defendants.
(b)

Tri-K Contractors was a licensed general contrac-

tor who entered into a direct contract with Cascade Enterprises.
(T.T. - page 750, lines 10-25; page 751, lines 1-5; page 779,
lines 11-24.)
(c)

The December 10, 1985, Escrow and Non-Merger

Agreement prepared by plaintiffs for the aborted closing on that
date was a void document replaced by the December 13, 1985, Final
Settlement Agreement plaintiffs took benefit under on the
December 13, 1985, closing and sale.
(d)

(T.T. - pages 781-786.)

It was established at trial that plaintiffs were

in default on the Trust Deed Note as of December 13, 1986, with
interest accruing at 17% on the balance due and owing of
$70,000.00 as of that date.

(Ref. - Trust Deed Note.)

2.- In regard to the bifurcated trial held on February 28,
1990, the following facts were established:
(a)

The settlement agreement negotiated and agreed

upon directly involved the DeBrys and defendants Sherwin Knudsen
and Tri-K Contractors.
(b)

(Ref. - Order at Trial.)

Only Tri-K Contractors and Sherwin Knudsen, as

defendants, and the DeBrys, as plaintiffs, participated in the
selection of the masters panel, the expenses of the panel,
payment for necessary testing, supervision of repair work and the
-9-

actual cost of masonry repairs.
(c)

(Ref. - Order at Trial.)

All matters regarding plaintiffs' claims in

regard

to the masonry were resolved by this settlement with the exception of the consequential damage claims pertaining thereto.
(Ref. - Order at Trial.)
3.

Cascade defendants did not stipulate to accept any

responsibility for any costs relating to inspection, testing,
supervision or repair of masonry on the building.

(Ref. - Order

at Trial.)
4.

Cascade defendants did, in fact, object to the Masters1

Panel Report at the main trial held on May 21, 1990, at the time
the report was submitted at trial by the plaintiffs, during trial
when Edward Wells, plaintiffs' co-counsel, repeatedly offered
characterizations of the report, also in regard to plaintiffs'
consequential damage claims, and in response to plaintiffs1
motion for directed verdict under the Masters' Panel Report,
prior to closing arguments.

(T.T. - page 558, lines 7-11; pages

1645-1647; pages 217-218.)
5.

Cascade defendants further objected to any damage award

relating to the directed verdict and the Masters' Panel Report in
post-trial motions, including their objection to the memorandum
decision issued by the court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS ARE NOT FACTUAL
OR RESPONSIVE TO THE ISSUES AT HAND.
A review of plaintiff's memorandum reflects the fact that
plaintiff is attempting to relitigate old issues previously
-1-

settled.

Contrary to plaintiff's allegations, the birfurcated

trial involving masonry defects was reduced to settlement on
February 28, 1990.

On June 20, 1990, a unanimous jury rendered

its decision regarding plaintiffs' breach, active interference,
fraud and conspiracy to defraud, based upon the evidence presented at trial, including plaintiffs' void Escrow and Non-Merger
Agreement and the Final Settlement Agreement which replaced it.
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the jury found that Cascade's
assertions in regard to the Trust Deed and Note were, in fact,
true.

Included in that decision was the finding that plaintiffs

conspired to defraud defendants at the closing and sale of the
building.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF MISCHARACTERIZES
THE APRIL 5f 1991, CONFERENCE.
Cascade defendants dispute the representations made by
plaintiff in regard to the April 5, 1991, conference.

The court

did not find that there was no basis in fact or law for the
imposition of treble damages against plaintiffs* alleged misconduct at trial.

The court actually stated that those specific

issues would not be ruled upon by the court, but would have to be
addressed another day, in another court, and in conjunction with
that statement, the court also stated that damages under active
interference should also be included in a new complaint if defendants chose to proceed under that finding.

The court further

addressed the forwarding of contemptuous conduct charges against
Robert J. DeBry and Edward T. Wells in this case to the presiding
judge for disposition.
-4-

which you have stipulated."
The Court:

(T.T. - page 1647, lines 18-19, 22-23.)

"The motion for the parties to be bound by the

masonry report is granted.

The question before the jury now is

whether or not consequential damages flowed from the alleged
masonry defects."

(T.T. - page 1648, lines 16-19.)

Based upon these specific and clear facts there can be no
question that the $30,000.00 in masonry repairs claimed by
plaintiffs against Cascade are improper and must be disallowed.
POINT V
CASCADE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED
TO COSTS, ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
OF COURT.
Cascade defendants contend that they are entitled to their

costs in this matter pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, due to the fact that Cascade defendants were the
prevailing party in this case and more specifically due to the
fact that the parties voluntarily entered into the Trust Deed
with Assignment of Rents #UT 105660, wherein plaintiffs specifically agreed to pay all costs associated with the enforcement of
that document.
It is noted that plaintiffs failed to prevail in nearly
every phase of their complaint against Cascade defendants,
including negligence, breach of implied warranty, implied
warranty of good workmanship, express warranty of occupancy,
implied warranty of habitability, implied warranty of fitness for
intended purpose, consequential damages, breach of contract,
alternate negligence and fraud.

On the other hand Cascade defen-

dants sustained every claim made against plaintiffs at trial.
-8-

The courts have consistently held the prevailing party in a
suit is entitled to costs and attorney's fees when they are
provided for by statute or contract.

Besinger v. Behunin, 584

P.2d 801 (Utah 1978); Stubbs v. Hemmert, Utah 567 P.2d 168
(1977), Utah 93, IP.2d 950, 75 ALR 1393.
CONCLUSION
Cascade defendants have submitted to the court and to
plaintiffs a proposed form of judgment that incorporates the
necessary adjustments to the memorandum decision to render a
final judgment in this case and to make way for this action to
proceed on appeal.

There is no question that resolution of the

masonry defects issue, previous interest stipulation and costs
are valid considerations that the court should rule upon in favor
of Cascade defendants to facilitate final conclusion of this phase
of litigation.

-9-

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ J J / y 9 day

of

April,

1991

s / './ /_ ^-}"Jr-r
DEL K. BARTEL
Attorney Pro Se for Defendants
Cascade Enterprises, Cascade
Construction and Del K. Bartel

DALE THURGOOD
Attorney Pro Se for Defendants
Cascade Enterprises, Cascade
Construction and Dale Thurgood

RTEL
I/EgXALLAN BARTEL
At torney Pro Se for Defendants
Cascade Construction and
Lee Allan Bartel
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing CASCADE DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO CLARIFY, ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT AND
FOR FINAL RULING UPON DEFENDANTS' POST-TRIAL MOTIONS was handdelivered to plaintiff Robert J. DeBry's attorney, Alan L. Sullivan,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, Suite 1600, 50 South Main
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

84144; and mailed to plaintiff Joan

DeBry, 5320 Baywood Circle, Holladay, Utah
day of April, 1991.

-10-

84117, this

c0QnO

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
* * *

ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
Salt Lake City, Utah
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* * *

BRAD J. YOUNG
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:
C86-553.

Debry vs. Cascade Enterprises et al.,

Counsel will state an appearance
MR. SULLIVAN:

Alan Sullivan here today on behalf o

the plaintiff Robert Debry.
MR. HUGHES:

Robert Hughes on behalf of Tri-K

Contractors, your Honor,
MR. THURGOOD:

Dale Thurgood pro se.

MR. LEE BARTEL: Lee Bartel pro se.
MR. DEL BARTEL:
THE COURT:

Del Bartel pro se.

You may proceed.

MR. DEL BARTEL:

Your Honor, Cascade defendants'

motion is in response to the Court's memorandum decision, and
involves several outstanding issues.

While we had a

discussion, a conference on April 5, I believe that there are
still three matters that remained outstanding after that

—

after those discussions were held.
THE COURT:

Identify them for the record.

MR. DEL BARTEL:

The first one is the issue of

masonry defect damage -- the masonry defects damage award of
$30,000, included in the special verdicts form.

The second

issue involved the August 3, 1990 order after hearing.
the third item was Cascade defendants1 costs —

And

attorney's

fees and costs of court.
In regard to the first issue, involving masonry

2

1

defects claims, the Cascade defendants contend that those

2

issues were previously adjudicated at the prior severed trial

3

which occurred on February 28 of 1990.

4

plaintiffs and Tri-K Contractors, Sherwin Knudsen, entered

5

into a stipulated settlement agreement, in which Cascade was a

6

nominal party.

7

that Tri~K and the plaintiffs had previously discussed

8

settlement prior to the trial.

9

the jury had been selected, I believe it was Mr, Hughes, on

At that time the

We would point out to the Court that the

—

At the time of trial and after

10

behalf of Tri-K, indicated to the Court that there was an

11

outstanding settlement possibility.

12

plaintiffs and Tri-K to enter into further settlement

13

discussions, if that was their wish.

14

And Cascade defendants were excluded from those discussions.

15

The Court invited the

They chose to do that.

Later on, a settlement, a stipulated settlement

16

agreement was read onto the record by and between those

17

parties.

18

left here, and the Debrys attempted to pursue a consequential

19

damage claim against Cascade defendants.

20

objected, saying that there was no proof of direct damages.

21

That was why the panel was picked in the first place, was to

22

determine what, if any, defects existed in the masonry in the

23

building.

24

that, in fact, consequential damages could not be heard at

25

that time.

Mr. Hughes was then excused from that trial, and

At that time Cascade

Based upon Cascade's argument, the Court ruled

3

Plaintiffs then attempted to rescind the settlement
agreement that they had entered into between themselves and
Tri-K.

Mr. Hughes was recalled from his office, back over to

the Court.

Further discussions were held.

And the upshot of

it was that Cascade defendants agreed to a stipulation that
the masters panel report could be read at the main trial on
the issue of consequential damages.

There was some further

argument in regard to the propriety of the structural
engineers that were to be appointed on the panel, to make any
decisions about contractor's licensing, building permits, and
approved plans.

And the Court ruled that, in fact, anybody

could say anything at trial, and we were entitled to defend
those issues at the main trial.
Subsequently, at the main trial, the masters panel
report was read, over the objections of Cascade defendants at
various points.

The jury ultimately made a ruling that the

direct damage cost for the defects involving masonry would
equal $30,000.

Cascade contends that the only issue that

could be heard at the main trial, in regard to masonry, was
that issue involving the consequentials.

We feel that the

order at trial, on February 28, clearly enunciates what went
on.

It clearly describes what Cascade stipulated to.
On item 6 of the order at trial, there is a

series —

it states as part of the written report referred to

in paragraph 4 above, the panel would answer the following

4

1

specific questions.

2

question, which involved the building permit issue, the

3

contractor's licensing issue and the issue of approved plans.

4

I would note that the special verdicts form, the jury found

5

that in fact Cascade defendants did have a contractor's

6

license, that they did have a proper building permit, and that

7

they did work under approved plans.

8

outstanding issues that involved that area of the order at

9

trial.

10

And there were six subparts to that

Those were the only

Our contention is we were excluded from the initial

11

settlement agreement.

12

Tri-K and Sherwin Knudsen.

13

Knudsen and Tri-K as having the ultimate responsibility to

14

either repair or pay for the costs of the masonry defects.

15

Therefore, any claim involving direct damages on the masonry

16

would be held —

17

for.

18

Ultimate responsibility was accepted by
Plaintiffs accepted Sherwin

Tri-K would be held ultimately responsible

The second area that we address is the stipulation

19

that occurred after trial, and it involved plaintiffs1 motion

20

for stay of proceedings, which was heard on August 3 of 1990.

21

Plaintiffs were seeking additional time to obtain the

22

transcript of trial to pursue their motion for judgment

23

notwithstanding the verdict; or, in the alternative, a new

24

trial.

25

of time would elapse before the transcript would be available,

And defendants had a concern that a substantial amount

5

and they would then have an opportunity to review it and then
respond to the Court.

At that time plaintiffs agreed,

specifically, to allow for a 12-percent interest to run on
judgments in favor of the defendants from the date of the
verdict on.

And we asked the Court to acknowledge that.

THE COURT:

Is that a disputed issue today?

MR. SULLIVAN:
THE COURT:

It is not, your Honor.

You may proceed.

MR. DEL BARTEL:

The third issue involves costs.

Cascade defendants believe that they are entitled to their
costs of court, attorney's fees, and additional costs in
proceeding with the case, consistent with Rule 54 (d)(1) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and also in conjunction

—

which calls for -- states that the prevailing party is
entitled to their costs.
THE COURT:

That's the question that has confronted

the Court since the jury verdict was entered.

Who is the

prevailing party?
MR. DEL BARTEL:

Cascade's position is that the

defendants had a -- their ninth amended complaint consisted of
74 pages of accusations, of which two pages contained the
defects, cited defects issue.
cited.

There was 203 defects that were

The ultimate ruling by the jury was on three:

miscellaneous damages, which were not cited in the complaint;
architectural damages, which were not cited in the complaint;

6

and the masonry issue, which is part of our objection today.
On the other hand, Cascade believes that, in fact,
the special verdicts form shows that the jury sustained all
the principal causes of action of the defendants, which
included fraud, conspiracy, breach, and active interference.
We further contend that the trust deed with
assignment of rents -- leases, excuse me, which was signed by
the parties, calls for the payment of costs in the event of a
default.
THE COURT:

Cite the Court the appropriate language

on which you rely.
MR. DEL BARTEL:
THE COURT:

Identify

MR. DEL BARTEL:
number UT105660.

M

Under paragraph 6

—

—

Paragraph 6 of the trust deed note,

Should trustor fail to make any payment or

to do any act as herein provided, then beneficiary or trustee,
but without obligation to do so and without notice to or
demand upon trustor and without releasing trustor from any
obligation hereof, may make or do the same in such manner and
to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect the
security hereof.

Beneficiary or trustee being authorized to

enter upon said property for such purposes, commence, appear
in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect
the security hereof or the rights or powers of the beneficiary
or trustee, pay, purchase, contest or compromise any

7

encumbrance, charge or lien which, in the judgment of either,
appears to be prior or superior hereto, and in exercising any
such powers incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in
its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefore,
including costs of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay
his reasonable fees."
THE COURT:

Stop for just a moment.

The Court has

reached a preliminary decision on the awarding or nonawarding
of fees and costs pursuant to Rule 54.

The Court has some

interest in plaintiffs1 response to the provision for fees and
costs pursuant to the express language of the trust deed note.
Would you like to respond?
MR. SULLIVAN:

I would be happy to, your Honor•

First of all, on attorney's fees, these people have been
representing themselves pro se in this case.

I donft

understand what they are arguing for award of attorney's fees.
Secondly, costs, quite frankly, I did not understand
the language that they read to entitle them to costs.
Nevertheless

—

THE COURT:

Would you like to refer to the language

that was cited in the trust deed note?

Take just a moment and

refer to the appropriate language, and then you may respond.
MR. SULLIVAN:

It is correct, your Honor, that they

are entitled to their attorney's fees, if they say so here,
their costs, if they prevail in an action under the trust

8

1

deed.

2

same rule as Rule 54 provides.

3

in any action is entitled to costs.

4

question, who is the prevailing party?

5

What I am trying to argue, your Honor, is that is the

THE COURT:

That is, the prevailing party
It doesnft answer the

The Court would like to have further

6

analysis on the record, relating to that question.

There may

7

be a legitimate dispute as to who the prevailing party, as

8

such, is in this lawsuit, inasmuch as both parties were

9

awarded some financial remuneration by the jury.

The

10

defendants are going to argue they are prevailing because they

11

were awarded more money than the plaintiffs.

12

convinced that there is recent case law that disputes that

13

notion.

14

The Court is

However, the Court believes the defendants have a

15

much stronger case in seeking and being awarded costs,

16

clearly, and, perhaps, legal fees, if the argument of pro se

17

representation is effectively met, under the express language

18

of the trust deed note.

19

action is taken for the protection or the enforcement of the

20

trust deed note, the party incurlng those expenses is entitled

21

to legal fees and costs if they prevail.

22

of the paragraph cited to the Court, is it not?

23
24
25

MR. SULLIVAN:

The note itself provides that if

That is the essence

It is, your Honor.

May I respond to

that?
THE COURT:

Yes.

Let's take it in reverse order.

9

1

Before addressing the question of whether or not the pro se

2

defendants are entitled to legal fees, which, admittedly, is a

3

more difficult matter to address, go to

4

MR. SULLIVAN:

the

I will, your Honor.

costs.
If the Debrys

5

had not been entitled to any damages, themselves, it seems

6

clear to me, as the Court has observed, that these people

7

would have a right to costs both under Rule 54 and under the

8

contract.

9

have been awarded other relief, by stipulation, that relates

10

directly to the defendants1 entitlement -- entitlements under

11

the trust deed note.

12

However, the Debrys have been awarded damages, and

What I am talking about, your Honor, is, in very

13

simple terms, the Cascade people were owed some money under

14

the trust deed note for the construction of a building.

15

this case, they have sought to enforce that right.

16

Debrys, on the other hand, have sought to enforce their right

17

to be paid by Cascade defendants for defects in that very same

18

building.

19

In

The

Now, I can see a situation in which the Debrys may

20

end up being owed more money by the defendants in this case

21

than they owe the defendants.

22

defects in this case is the masonry defects.

23

Knudsen is under an obligation, pursuant to the stipulation,

24

to fix those masonry defects.

25

appointed by the Court has estimated that the amount of money

In other words, one of the
And Sherwin

And the masters panel that was

10

necessary to pay for those masonry defects is going to be over
$163,000.

In addition to that, the Debrys have been awarded

damages for other defects, in the amount of I think $22,000,
from the Cascade defendants.
Now, if plaintiffs are owed more by Cascade people
and those with whom they contracted than the Cascade people
are owed by the Debrys under the contract, I don't see how
they can be held to have prevailed under this contract
provision.

I mean, it doesn't make sense that they would be

entitled to attorney's fees, even under the contract, even
under the trust deed note, if, as a result of this legal
action, they end up owing the Debrys, or their contractor owes
the Debrys for the construction of this very building, more
than they are owed by the Debrys.

In other words, they have

got to prevail in some net fashion in order to actuate this
contract provision.
THE COURT:

If the Court were to rule as follows,

would they not be the prevailing party?

And that is, that,

pursuant to a contractual agreement, the defendants are not
obligated for masonry defects, because that obligation was
assumed by negotiated agreement with Tri-K and plaintiffs?
Number one.

And/or the defendants are the prevailing party

because, even if they are obligated to the plaintiffs for
masonry defects, the obligation can be satisfied with the
payment of a $30,000 debt?

11

1
2

MR. SULLIVAN:

I didn't quite understand the last

part.

3

THE COURT:

The jury awarded a judgment in behalf of

4

the plaintiff against the defendants for $30,000.

5

Court rules that, irrespective of any agreement between Tri-K

6

and the plaintiffs relating to masonry work, the sum total of

7

the defendants' obligation to the plaintiff, regarding masonry

8

work, is limited to $30,000, would they still not be the

9

prevailing party?

10

MR. SULLIVAN:

No, they would not.

If the

Then what we

11

have here, your Honor, is a conclusion that whoever gets the

12

most -- whoever nets the most money is the prevailing party,

13

And that in Utah is not the law.

14

THE COURT:

The Court agrees in principle with you.

15

MR. SULLIVAN:

I believe that's not the law in

16

Utah.

17

costs.

18

action, with no offsets, and if the Court could conclude,

19

therefore, that the Debrys were completely unjustified legally

20

and factually in seeking, in effect, offsets, then they would

21

clearly be the prevailing party.

22

here.

23

lawsuit, and neither party, in effect, was the prevailing

24

party.

25

That's why I don't think they are entitled to recover
I mean, if they prevailed entirely on their contract

There were offsets.

But that's not what happened

As a result, there was this

Both parties got a portion of what they wanted.
THE COURT:

Respond to a third scenario propounded

12

Court in error?
MR. SULLIVAN:

I think the issue we are on now, I

have lost that one issue, on interest, and what we are arguing
about now -THE COURT:

Is the awarding of fees and costs

MR. SULLIVAN:

On prevailing parties,

both parties prevailed to a certain extent.

—

I am saying

My understanding

of the cases of the Utah Supreme Court is that neither party
is to be awarded costs in those instances.

And that's our

position.
THE COURT:

Anything further?

The Court rules that

any provision in the trust deed note that would provide the
awarding of fees are inapplicable to the defendants, because
they have not incurred in legal fees, set forth in affidavit
form to the Court.
Regarding the costs that are referred to in the
trust deed note language, the Court finds that there was no
prevailing party, consistent with the jury verdict, because
damages were awarded in behalf of and against each party in
the lawsuit.

Therefore, fees and costs are not properly

assessable under the provision of the trust deed note, because
of no prevailing party.
Now, is there any ambiguity regarding the ruling of
the Court?
MR. DEL BARTEL:

If I may.

I understand that,

46

1

because the Court has ruled there is no prevailing party in

2

the case, there is no award of cost3.

3

THE COURT:

Or fees.

4

MR. DEL BARTEL:

However, the Court referenced the

5

fact that we -- Cascade defendants failed to submit an

6

affidavit of costs.

7

from the signing of the judgment to do that, if, in fact, the

8

Court is going to deny on the prevailing party?

9

THE COURT:

Isn't it a fact that we have five days

The Court is denying the awarding of

10

costs and fees because there is no prevailing party.

11

Court is also saying that, in addition thereto, legal fees

12

could not be awarded, because they have not been incurred.

13

You are pro se.

14

MR. DEL BARTEL:

15

your Honor.

16

of the case.

17

The

We did have legal fees, though,

We had attorney fees, $27,000 worth, at the first
That's what we were praying for.

THE COURT:

The Court will not address that issue,

18

having found that fees and costs are not to be awarded,

19

because there is no prevailing party, consistent with the

20

language of the trust deed note.

21

MR. SULLIVAN:

I am assuming that interest —

except

22

for the trust deed note obligation, interest runs from the

23

date of the jury verdict on all damages.

24
25

MR. DEL BARTEL:

I don't believe that's our

contention -- our contention is that last August the

47
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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
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Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,

]i
)
)
)
,
i
>
!
)
i

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR ADDITUR,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUE
OF DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY
AND DAMAGES THEREFORE

Defendants.
i

Civil No. C86-553

'i

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,

t

vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,

;

Defendant.

;

Plaintiffs submit the following Memorandum in Support
of Their Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in
the alternative, for an additur, or in the alternative, for a new
trial

on

therefore.

the

issues

of

defendants'

liability

and

damages

6.

Breach of the following warranties:
a)

Occupancy;

b)

Defects in workmanship and materials;

c)

Warranty

building

built

as

required

by

Uniform Building Code.
d)

Habitability;

e)

Workmanship;

f)

Fitness for purpose.

Those motions were based on the evidence set forth
above.

The motions were denied.

Plaintiffs now have brought a

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for
additur or alternatively a new trial.
The function of the rule allowing the court to enter
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict is to permit the trial
court to submit the case to the jury for their determination and
then, if the verdict goes adverse to the moving party, the court
can, when there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and
rule upon whether a jury question truly exists.
Utah 2d 193, 264 P.2d 855 (1953).

Roche v. Zee, 1

In passing upon a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court is governed by
the

same

verdict.
(1967).

rules

as

when

passing

upon a motion

for directed

Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566
A directed verdict is appropriate when the court is able
6

to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would not
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented.
Management Committee v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah
1982).

For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff submits

that reasonable minds could

not differ on the uncontroverted

evidence presented and that judgment in favor of the plaintiff
should be entered as set forth herein below and the counterclaim
of defendants dismissed.
In the alternative, plaintiffs move for an additur, or
alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD CANNOT BE LEGALLY
SUPPORTED. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive
damages

in the sum of

$125,000.

For the reasons set forth

hereinafter, said award cannot stand and must be vacated.
The basis for the awarding of punitive damages in the
State of Utah is set forth by statute.
1(1)(a) provides:

7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-

to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable minds would not
differ on the facts to be determined from the evidence presented.
Management Committee v. Greystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah
1982).

For the reasons set forth below, the plaintiff submits

that reasonable minds could

not differ on the uncontroverted

evidence presented and that judgment in favor of the plaintiff
should be entered as set forth herein below and the counterclaim
of defendants dismissed.
In the alternative, plaintiffs move for an additur, or
alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD CANNOT BE LEGALLY
SUPPORTED. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY
TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive
damages

in the sum of $125,000.

For the reasons set forth

hereinafter, said award cannot stand and must be vacated.
The basis for the awarding of punitive damages in the
State of Utah is set forth by statute.
1(1)(a) provides:

7

Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-

Except as otherwise provided by statute,
punitive damages may be awarded only if
compensatory or general damages are awarded
and it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and
malicious
or intentionally
fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others.
It is clear that only under the terms of the statute
may punitive damages be awarded.
For punitive damages to be awarded under the statute,
two elements are necessary under Section 1(a). First, there must
be a finding by the jury that the conduct of the tortfeasor is
either:

(a)

willful

and

malicious,

or

(b)

intentionally

fraudulent or manifests knowing and reckless indifference toward
the

rights

of

others.

Second,

there must

be

an award of

compensatory or general damages.
It is the position of plaintiff that neither of these
elements has been met, and that lack of either is sufficient to
require the court to vacate the punitive damage award.
1.

Damage award.
The statute, as well as case law, requires an award of

general

or compensatory damages to sustain a punitive damage

award.

The statutory requirement is consistent with the case law

of Utah which has always required a general damage award in a law

8

case to sustain a punitive damage award.

See, e.g., Maw v. Weber

Basin Water Conservancy District, 20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230
(1968); Graham v. Street, 2 Utah 2d 144, 270 P.2d 456 (1954).
The rule as set forth in Graham, supra is

M

[T]here can be no

punitive damages without compensatory damages based on the tort."
2 Utah 2d at 150. As the Graham court observed "[T]he failure to
allege and prove a tort giving rise to compensatory

damages

vitiates the claim for punitive damage." Id.
This statement of the Graham court is based upon two
well accepted legal principles.
be

awarded

National

for breach

Bank

of

v. Evans,

First, punitive damages cannot

contract.

107 Ariz.

See, e.g.,
378, 489 P.2d

Continental
15

(1971);

Williams v. Speedster, Inc., 175 colo. 73, 485 P.2d 728 (1971);
Modern Air Conditioning Inc. v. Cinderella Homes Inc., 226, Kan.
70, 596 P.2d 816 (1979); Purinqton v. Sound West, 566 P.2d 795
(Mont. 1977); Fox v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1975); Waters
v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d

1187 (Wyo. 1972).

Second, without an

award of damages for the tort on which the punitive damage award
is based, such award cannot stand. See, e.g., Graham v. Street,
supra; LaFrentz v. Gallagher, 105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969);
Wagner v. Dan Unfuq Motors, Inc., 35 Colo. App. 102, 529 P.2d 656
(1974); Boise Dodge Inc. v. Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551
(1969); Dold v. Sherow,. 220 Kan. 350, 552 P.2d 945 (1976);
9

Purinqton v. Sound West, supra; City of Reno v. Silver State
Flying

Service,

Inc.,

84

Nev.

170,

438

P.2d

257

(1968);

Christman v. Voyer, 92 N.M. 772, 595 P.2d 410 (1979); State v.
Brown, 519 P.2d 491 (Okla. 1974); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or.
387, 498 P,2d 744 (1972) .
In the present case, the jury gave only one damage
award.

The award was for breach of the trust deed note (a

breach of contract).

They then awarded $125,000 in punitive

damages.
The award of $62,500 plus interest was on defendants'
first cause of action in the counterclaim.

No punitive damages

were sought for the breach of contract action nor could they be
lawfully allowed under the cases cited above.
In question 36 of the special interrogatories, the jury
awarded recovery on the face amount of the Trust Deed Note plus
interest.

With

respect

to

the

claims

of

defendants

to

entitlement to general or compensatory damages for "costs spent
after the sale" and "extras not paid for" the jury awarded $0 in
each category.
These two categories were the "general" or "compensatory" damages, an award of which is an absolute prerequisite
under the statute and case law before a punitive damage award may
stand.
10

Therefore, it is manifest that under the statute and
cases cited herein, the punitive damage award of $125,000 must
fail.
In addition to the statutory requirement of general
damages,

before

punitives

may

be

awarded,

the

statute

also

requires a finding that the act for which punitive damages are
awarded be either:

(a) willful and malicious; (b) intentionally

fraudulent; or (c) manifest a knowing and reckless indifference
toward and disregard of the rights of others.
This requires two things to occur before an award can
stand:
1.

A finding of one of the above elements by the
jury.

2.

Such finding must be based upon instructions to
the jury defining the said elements and informing
the jury of their necessity before punitives may
be awarded.

Since neither instructions nor a finding exist, the
award cannot stand.
Plaintiffs herein are entitled as a matter of law to
have the punitive damage award stricken.

11

POINT II
AS A HATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS DALE THURGOOD AND DEL
BARTEL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE TRUST DEED
AND NOTE AND NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSE
THE SAME. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE
TO VACATE THE AWARD
The evidence in the case clearly shows that defendants
Dale

Thurgood

and

Del Bartel

assigned

all right, title and

interest they possessed in the Trust Deed and Note for $62,500
to Utah Title (Exhibits 11,12 & 13).
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one
year, nor any trust or power over or
concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted,
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed
or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting,
assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his
lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing..
To paraphrase, "no estate or interest in real property
. shall be . . . assigned . . . otherwise than • . . in
writing subscribed by the party

. . .

assigning

. . . the

s ame. . . ."
Therefore, by statute, the only way Thurgood and Bartel
could ever again obtain an interest in the Trust Deed and Note
(Exhibits 11 and 13) after having assigned away all of their
12

interest therein (Exhibit 12) would be by written assignment back
from Utah Title.
An oral assignment is impossible under Utah Code Ann. §
25-5-1, yet this is exactly what is claimed to have occurred.
The jury made no finding that the defendants owned the Trust Deed
and Note.
The record in this case is devoid of any evidence to
support a claim of interest of defendants in the Trust Deed and
Note.

By statute (25-5-1) the only method by which they could

obtain any interest is a written assignment.
Therefore, as a matter of law, Utah Title owns the
Trust Deed and Note and the defendants herein have no right title
or interest therein and lack standing to foreclose the same.
Therefore, the court must dismiss count one of the
counterclaim and vacate the jury's award thereunder, there being
no evidence upon which such award can legally be based.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. § 42-2-10 PRECLUDES DEFENDANTS FROM
MAINTAINING THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO
DISMISS THEIR COUNTERCLAIM
In the present case, plaintiffs assert that Utah Code
Ann. § 42-2-10 precludes suit herein by the Cascade defendants on
their counterclaims.

The language of the statute is clear.

13

The

testimony of Mr, Van Alstyne, the Director of the Division of
Corporations

and Commercial Code was clear.

He stated that

defendants Del Bartel, Lee Bartel and Dale Thurgood were not and
had

not at any previous time ever legally complied with the

filing requirements of Section 42-2-5 and, therefore, the penalty
provided in Section 42-2-10 was applicable.
The court

ruled

that

as a

factual matter, Cascade

defendants had made a good faith attempt to comply by attempting
to file even though they could not legally file under the names
Cascade Construction or Cascade Enterprises.
Plaintiffs

respectfully

urge

that

such

ruling

is

erroneous for the following reasons:
The

statute

attempts to comply.
filing

an

assumed

(Section 42-2-5).

makes

no

provision

for

"good

faith"

The statute is mandatory and provides for
name

at

the

time

one

commences

business

The risk one runs if one fails to comply with

Section 42-2-5 at the time one commences business is that at some
future date the chosen fictitious name will not be available for
use.

That is the contingency which has befallen

herein.

defendants

For six years they ignored the mandate of Section 42-2-5

and then, when faced with the penalty of Section 42-2-10, they
found

themselves

unable to comply

registered to another.
14

legally

as the names were

The crucial question involved is whether this court has
the power to judicially create a "good faith" exception to the
filing requirement of Section 42-2-5 and the ensuing penalty for
non-compliance found in Section 42-2-10.
It is a clearly accepted principle of law that a court
has no power to enlarge the scope of a statute nor to amend it
by judicial interpretation.

Schroder v. Kansas State Highway

Commission/ 199 Kan. 175, 428 P.2d 814 (1967); Anderson v. City
of Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970).

As observed by

the Utah Court of Appeals, "The court's primary responsibility in
construing legislation is to give effect to the intent of the
legislature."
1987).

State v. Jones, 735 P.2d

399, 402

(Utah App.

See, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934,

936 (Utah 1980); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d
755 (Utah 1982).
effect

to

the

The court's primary responsibility is to give
legislature's

intent.

Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1984).
663 P.2d

American

Coal

Co. v.

See, Murray City v. Hall,

1314 (Utah 1983); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah

1977) .
The legislative intent of Section 42-2-5 £t seq. is
clear.

There is no equivocation.

The mandate is "File your dba

before you do business or run the risk of not being able to use
15

the courts

of this

state until you can legally comply with

Section 42-2-5. M
Nowhere

is

there

any

statutory

language

regarding

excuses for not filing or relating to good faith attempts to
comply.

The language is clear.

Comply or you are barred from

using state courts.
There

is

no

evidence

compliance with Section 42-2-5.

in

the

record

showing

legal

The testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne

is unequivocal that there was no compliance by the defendants
herein

who

did

not

legally

file

under

the

Construction Company and Cascade Enterprises.
only

avenue open

mandate

of

to

Section

name

Cascade

Therefore, the

the court is to follow the legislative
42-2-10

and

dismiss

the

counterclaims.

Defendants must bear the burden of their failure to comply with
the statutory mandate of Section 42-2-5.
POINT IV
THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF WARRANT AND NEGLIGENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT
SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes. . .
16

(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the
influence or passion or prejudice.
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant
an additur to the verdict.

In Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42,

327 P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated:
There is implicit within the authority of the
court to grant a new trial on the statutory
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages"
the power to order a new trial conditionally;
that is, to order that a new trial be granted
unless the party adversely affected by the
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of
the damages to an amount within proper limits
as viewed by the court.
The Court explained that this process of modifying the
verdict

to

situations

bring
where

it

within

the verdict

the

evidence

is outside

the

is

reserved

for

limits of what

appears justifiable under the evidence to such an extent that the
verdict should not be permitted to stand.

I_d. at 829.

In Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671
(1953),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

explained

the

standard

in

determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows:
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict
presents a situation that such inadequacy or
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury
of the evidence or the instructions of the
court as to the law applicable to the case as
to satisfy the court that the verdict was
17

rendered under such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or influence of
passion or prejudice, then the court may
exercise its discretion in the interest of
justice and grant a new trial*
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 701 (Utah) by stating that an
additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts;
or misunderstood or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence."

rd.

at

354.

The plaintiff acknowledges that it is generally the
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages.
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978).

Where, however, the

standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can
and should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the
verdict within the limits of the evidence.

Such is the case

here.
This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur.
This is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict.

The

damage award of that verdict is inconsistent with the special
verdicts rendered by that same jury.
The

jury

found

the defendants breached

the implied

warranty that the building would be built as required by the
18

Uniform Building Code (Question No. 4(a)),

The court found as a

matter of law, the masonry way negligently installed.

The proper

measure of damages is cost of repair of the code defects.
Exhibits

205,

violations needing repair.

206,

207

and

208

establish

code

Defendants offered no proof at trial

that any specific code violations set forth in Exhibits 205, 206,
207 or 200 had been repaired.
"repairs"

were

While there was evidence that

made, no evidence

was

produced

to show what

repairs were made, by whom, or that the repairs corrected any
specific defect.
Bill Karren testified and gave a bid to fix the said
code defects.

The defects needing repairs were categorized as

follows:
a)

Masonry;

b)

Roof and floor;

c)

Trusses;

d)

Heating and plumbing;

e)

Electrical;

f)

Parking lot;

g)

West stair;

h)

architectural; and

i)

miscellaneous.
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Bill Karren testified to the cost of repairs in each
category.

Defendants

offered

no

contradictory

or

rebuttal

testimony to show either:
a)

The repairs could be competently completed at a
lesser charge; or

b)

Any specific repair was not needed.

Therefore, the only competent evidence before the jury
on cost of repair was that of Mr. Karren.
There

is no basis

in the evidence

for the amounts

listed by the jury in answer to Question No. 18.

Nor is there

evidence in the record from which the said amounts listed by the
jury could have been arrived at by mathematical calculation.
is clear that the numbers are random.

It

It is also clear, however,

that the jury found plaintiffs were entitled to recover the costs
of repairs for code defects.
When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the
court usually leaves it as it is.
evidence
conform

to
the

support
award

When, however, there is no

an award, the court may take action to

to the evidence.

See, Weber Basin Water

Conservancy District v. Skeen, supra.
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation
where inadequate damages are awarded.
supra.
20

See, Bodon v. Suhrmann,

In the present case, the Masters' panel found the cost
of masonry repairs to be $161,885.

Mr. Bill Karren testified

the cost of repair would be $161,885.
admitted at trial.

No contrary evidence was

As a minimum, the masonry repair costs should

be increased from $30,800 to $161,885.
Secondly, electrical repairs were $10,648 according to
Bill Karren.

No contrary evidence was admitted.

The electrical

award should be increased from $0 to $10,648.
Additionally, the following awards should be increased
since no contrary evidence was produced at trial.
Floor and Roof

$31,514

Trusses

10,549
TOTAL

$42,063

POINT V
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE A NEW TRIAL
ON NEGLIGENCE, WARRANTY AND ON DAMAGES FOR
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY
The court ruled at trial and instructed the jury that
defendants were negligent in constructing the building, yet the
jury answered Question No. 1 that defendants were not negligent
in constructing the building.
The jury answered question no. 4 "yes" thereby finding,
of

necessity,

that

the

building
21

was

constructed

with

code

violations (incliding of necessity the masonry defects).

Having

this ruled, and given the court's instruction that defendants
were

negligent

in construction

of

the masonry,

there

is no

logical basis for finding that the workmanship warranties were
not breached.

Also, there is no basis for the "no" answer to

question no. 1.
The court having ruled on the masonry defects (as a
result of defendants stipulation to be bound thereby) there is no
basis for finding there was no breach of warranties of occupancy
and habitability.
The only way the jury could have answered "no", as it
did, on question nos. 1, 4(b) and 4(e) would be to totally ignore
the court's instructions.
Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial.
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615
(1966); Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminant Domain, 236
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart, 5 Ariz. App. 24,
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Ry Co., 473 P.2d 549 (Mont.
1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974) .
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It has also been held that where the interrogatory
answers are inconsistent, a new trial is justified.

Van Cleve v.

Betts, 16 Wash. App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977).
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury verdict.

Efco Distributing, Inc. v.

Perrin, supra; Villeqas v. Bryson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61
(1972).
The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors
made at the trial.

In the present case, the jury made obvious

errors in not following the court's instruction on negligence and
warranty and in not answering Questions No. 2 & 3.

There are

obvious errors and failures to follow the evidence in the jury's
answers to Question No. 10.
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v.
Perrin, supra:
If is clearly appears that there has been a
miscarriage of justice because the jury has.
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted
evidence where there is no rational basis for
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that
the jury has acted under a misconception of
proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it appears that the
verdict was the result of passion and
prejudice, it is both the prerogative and the
duty of the court to set aside the verdict
and grant a new trial.
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not
follow the evidence.

In the event the court does not grant the
23

notwithstanding the verdict plaintiffs' motion for judgment and
the additur motion, a new trial should be granted on defendants'
liability and on the damages resulting therefrom.
CONCLUSION
The
justified

jury's

under

allowed to stand.

answers

to

the evidence

the

special

verdict

are not

in the case and should

not be

This is especially true of the failure to rule

on the proximate cause issue on negligence and damages therefore.
The

evidence

at

trial

argues

conclusively

for

a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict and an additur as requested
herein, or in the alternative, a new trial for plaintiffs as to
the negligence issues and damages on negligence and warranty.
DATED this ^ry^ttay of June, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiffs

* ^ EDWARD T. W£LLS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I
foregoing

certify

that

MEMORANDUM

IN

a

true

SUPPORT

and
OF

correct

PLAINTIFFS'

copy

of

the

MOTION

FOR

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR
ADDITUR, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUES OF
DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY AND DAMAGES THEREFORE, (DeBry v. Cascade,
et al.) was mailed, postage prepaid, on the

3

day of June*,

y.JY

1990, to the following:
Dale Thurgood
190 South 350 West
Bountiful, UT 84010
Del Bartel
9264 South 3400 West
West Jordan, UT 84088
Lee Allen Bartel
110 Merrimac Court
Vallejo, CA 94589

SP3-730\jn
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EDWARD T. WELLS - A3422
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT J. DEBRY and JOAN DEBRY,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, et al.,
Defendants.
CANADA LIFE ASSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ROBERT J. DEBRY, et al.,
Defendant.

]i
)
>
)
)
)
)
jl
)
])

SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING
THE VERDICT, OR IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR ADDITUR,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ISSUE
OF DEFENDANTS' LIABILITY
AND DAMAGES THEREFORE

]
i
;

Civil No. C86-553

;l

JUDGE PAT B. BRIAN

|
]

Pursuant to the court's order allowing re-submission of
authority upon completion of the transcript, plaintiffs submit the
following Substitute Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the alternative, for an
additur, or in the alternative, for a new trial on the issues of
defendants1 liability and damages therefore.

MATERIAL FACTS
At

trial,

the

following

facts

were

established

by

undisputed testimony.
1.

Cascade Enterprises has never lawfully filed as a

partnership pursuant to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §42-2-5.
(See, Exhibits 59 & 60; Tr. pp. 285, 301, 712, 1512, 1517, 1252.) !
2.

Cascade

Construction

Company

has

never

lawfully

filed as a partnership either under the name Cascade Construction
or Cascade Construction Company pursuant to the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5.
3.

Id.

The Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 11 & 13)

from Robert DeBry and Joan DeBry to defendants Del Bartel and Dale
Thurgood were assigned in writing to Utah Title & Abstract and the
assignment was recorded in the Salt Lake County recorder's office.
(See, Exhibit 12; Tr. pp. 622, 1608-10, 1615, 1617.)
4.

No evidence was produced that Utah Title & Abstract

Co. has ever given a written assignment of Exhibit 11 and 13 to
defendants Thurgood and Bartel and defendants testified they have
never received back an assignment of the Trust Deed and Note.

(Tr.

p. 1617.)

*Those portions of the transcript cited herein are attached
hereto as an appendix.
2

The Masters1 panel reported masonry defects in the

5.

building at 4252 South 700 East and the court ruled defendants were
negligent in constructing the masonry.
6.

Defendants

produced

findings of the Masters1 panel.
7.
building.

Exhibit

207

no

(See, Tr. 1647-48.)
evidence

to

refute

the

Id.

lists

electrical

defects

in

the

These defects were admitted by the electrician in

requests for admission.

No evidence was offered to dispute any of

the said defective code violations. (See, Tr. pp. 1670-73, 740-41.)
8.

Bill Karren testified that the cost of repair of the

electrical defects was $10,648.
dispute this amount.
9.

No testimony was received to

(Tr. p. 844, In. 2-6.)

Bill Karen testified the cost of masonry repairs was

$161,885. No testimony to the contrary was received.

(Tr. p. 842,

In 22.)
10.

The jury found that defendants breached an implied

warranty to construct the building as required by the Uniform
Building Code.
11.
building.

(Special Interrogatory No. 4.)
The jury awarded $5,000 for past repairs to the

(Question No. 5.)
12.

The jury awarded $47,615 for repairs of building

code violations.

(Question No. 6.)

3

13.

At trial, the unrefuted testimony was that code

violation repairs (masonry, roof and floor, trusses, electrical)
totalled $214,592.

(Tr. pp. 842-45.)

14.

No testimony was offered by defendants to show:

a)

The cost of repair was not as testified by Bill
Karren.

b)

Any of the repairs testified to by Mr. Karren to
meet code were not needed.

15.
west stair

The repair costs of heating and plumbing ($24,200),

($1,470),

architectural

($37,268)

and

miscellaneous

($11,816) contained code violation repairs, but such code violations were not delineated from other repairs. (Tr. pp. 842-45.)
16.

Defendants offered no evidence to refute the cost of

moving to and from and leasing alternate office space as being the
sum of $351,604.20.
17.

(See, Exhibit 245; Tr. pp. 693-98.)

Defendants

agreement- on December 10.
18.

signed

the

escrow

and

non-merger

(Exhibit 6; Tr. pp. 1118-19.)

The escrow and non-merger agreement (Ex. 6) was not

prepared as part of the closing, but as a separate contract and was
entered into on December 10.
19.

(Tr. pp. 1123-24.)

The closing would not have occurred without the said

contract (Ex. 6 ) . Id.
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20.

The contract was acknowledged by Thurgood and Bartel

on December 13, Tr. p. 785 In. 13 (testimony of Dale Thurgood);
deposition of Wendy Harris (notary); Exhibit 6.
21.

Exhibit 12, the assignment of Trust Deed and Note

was signed by both defendants and assigned all right, title and
interest they had in the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note (Ex. 11,
13) to Utah Abstract & Title Co.
22.

(See, Tr. pp. 622, 1609.)

Utah Title mailed the Trust Deed back to Thurgood

(Tr. p. 1615) but defendants do not have any documentation that the
note or the trust deed were ever assigned back to them.

(Tr. pp.

1609-10.)
23.

Indeed, defendants do not have and did not produce

the original Trust Deed Note which remains with Utah Title (see.
Affidavit of Bradley C. Harr) and defendants have admitted that
Utah Title has never assigned back either the Trust Deed or the
Trust Deed Note.
24.
occupancy,

(Tr. p. 1617, In. 7-11.)

The

Uniform

court

ruled

Building

that

Code,

habitability and fitness for purpose.
25.

warranties
workmanship

existed
and

as

to

materials,

(Tr. pp. 1640-41.)

Building permits issued by the county are always in

writing and there is no such thing as an oral building permit.
(Tr. p. 31.)
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26.

Exhibit 103 issued to defendants is a footings and

foundation only permit and cannot legally be used to build other
than footings and foundations.
27.
1987.

(Tr. p. 37.)

There was no full building permit issued prior to

(Tr. pp. 56, 61.)
28.

Defendants constructed the building with a footings

and foundation only permit.
29.

The only written permit defendants ever got from the

county was Exhibit 103.
30.

(Tr. pp. 131, 149, 183.)

(Tr. pp. 587, 983-84, 1090-91, 1219.)

Defendants admitted they have no evidence to show

other than a footings and foundation permit.
31.

(Tr. p. 626.)

The original file of Salt Lake County relating to

Exhibit 103 and the original application for a building permit in
1984 has never been lost.
32.

(Tr. pp. 100, 174.)

Exhibit 104 was the only set of plans submitted to

the county prior to 1987.

The said plans were not complete and

were only approved for footings and foundations. (Tr. pp. 38, 165,
570.)
33.

A

stop

work

order

on

the

building

was

issued

(Exhibit 100).
34.

The county has no record of lifting the stop work

order prior to 1987.

(Tr. pp. 49, 148.)
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35.

The stop work order would not be lifted until the

bounced check was made good,
36.
1987.

(Tr. p. 171.)

Defendants did not make the bounced check good until

(Tr. p. 1076-78.)
37.

There is no evidence the stop work order was lifted

prior to 1987.
38.

(Tr. pp. 49, 1106.)
Doing inspection when there is no proper permit does

not create a permit.
39.

(Tr. pp. 57, 104, 108, 167.)

The fact the county may make on inspection and pass

the building does not mean there are no defects or that existing
defects have been corrected.
40.

(Tr. pp. 57, 112, 142, 167.)

Salt Lake County ordered plaintiffs to vacate the

building because of structural defects affecting the safety of the
building.

(Tr. pp. 63-67, 92, 109-10.)
41.

order,

id.
42.

DeBry vacated the building because of the county
(see, Tr. p. 693.)
There was no evidence produced to show DeBrys had

any other reason for vacating the building.
43.

Plaintiffs could not legally make the repairs to the

building without a permit.
44.
defects.

(Tr. p. 61.)

It was defendants1 responsibility to correct the

(Tr. p. 61.)
45.

Defendants acknowledged they warranted they would
7

meet code requirements.
46.

(Tr. p. 3 03.)

The jury found that repair of code violations to the

west stair would cost $625.
47.

(Question No. 18(g).)

The jury found that repair of code violations in the

architectural category would cost $7,000.
48.

(Question No. 18(h).)

The jury found that repair of code violations in the

miscellaneous category would cost $10,000.
49.

The jury found that defendants suffered no general

or special damages.
50.

(Question No. 36.)

The only damages awarded to defen^^nt-^—W^FQ—for

breach of contract on the Trust Deed Note^
51.

(Question No. I8(i).)

The

jury

awarded

$125,000

(Question No. 3 6.)
punitive

damages.

(Question No. 3 6.)
52.

Defendants

offered

no specific

evidence

of any

claimed defect cited as defective by plaintiffs resulting from work
of subcontractors working for DeBry.
53.

Defendants offered no evidence of any specific work

done to repair existing defects in the building.
54.

Exhibits 205, 206, 207 and 208 recite specific

defects and code violations needing repair.
55.

Defendants offered no evidence to show that any code

defects listed in Exhibit 205, 206, 207 and 208 had been repaired
by them or their subcontractors.
8

Those motions were based on the evidence at trial as
highlighted above.

The motions were denied.

Plaintiffs now have

brought a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a
motion for additur or alternatively a new trial.
The function of the rule allowing the court to enter
judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict is to permit the trial
court to submit the case to the jury for their determination and
then, if the verdict goes adverse to the moving party, the court
can, when there is more time for deliberation, re-examine and rule
upon whether a jury question truly exists. Roche v. Zee, 1 Utah 2d
193, 264 P.2d 855 (1953).

In passing upon a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, the court is governed by the same
rules as when passing upon a motion for directed verdict.
Mavfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967).

Koer v.

A directed

verdict is appropriate when the court is able to conclude, as a
matter of law, that reasonable minds would not differ on the facts
to be determined from the evidence presented.
v. Grevstone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d

896

Management Committee

(Utah 1982).

For the

reasons set forth below, the plaintiff submits that reasonable
minds could not differ on the uncontroverted evidence presented and
that judgment in favor of the plaintiff should be entered as set
forth herein below and the counterclaim of defendants dismissed.
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In the alternative, plaintiffs move for an additur, or
alternatively, for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure,
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD CANNOT BE LEGALLY SUPPORTED. THE
JURYfS VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO VACATE SUCH AWARD
The jury in this case awarded to defendants punitive
damages in the sum of $125,000.

For the reasons set forth

hereinafter, said award cannot stand and must be vacated.
The basis for the awarding of punitive damages in the
State of Utah is set forth in case law and by statute.

Utah Code

Ann. § 78-18-1(1)(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute,
punitive damages may be awarded only if
compensatory or general damages are awarded
and it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct,
or conduct that manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard
of, the rights of others.
It is clear that only under the rules set forth in case
law, or under the terms of the statute may punitive damages be
awarded.
For punitive damages to be awarded under the statute, two
elements are necessary under Section 1(a).
11
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to

, '" Id .

compensatory

damages

This statement of the Graham court is based upon two well
accepted

legal principles.

First, punitive damages cannot be

awarded for breach of contract.

See, e.g., Continental National

Bank v. Evans, 107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d

15

(1971); Williams v.

Speedster, Inc. , 175 colo. 73, 485 P.2d 728

(1971); Modern Air

Conditioning Inc. v. Cinderella Homes Inc. , 226, Kan. 70, 596 P.2d
816 (1979); Purinqton v. Sound West, 566 P.2d 795 (Mont. 1977); Fox
v. Overton, 534 P.2d 679 (Okla. 1975); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503
P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972).

Second, without an award of damages for the

tort on which the punitive damage award is based, such award cannot
stand. See, e.g., Graham v. Street, supra; LaFrentz v. Gallagher,
105 Ariz. 255, 462 P.2d 804 (1969); Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors,
Inc., 35 Colo. App. 102, 529 P.2d 656 (1974); Boise Dodge Inc. v.
Clark, 92 Idaho 902, 453 P.2d 551 (1969); Dold v. Sherow. 220 Kan.
350, 552 P.2d 945 (1976);
Purington v. Sound West, supra; City of Reno v. Silver State Flying
Service, -Inc. , 84 Nev. 170, 438 P.2d

257

(1968); Christman v.

Voyer, 92 N.M. 772, 595 P.2d 410 (1979); State v. Brown, 519 P.2d
491 (Okla. 1974); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 498 P.2d 744
(1972) .
In the present case, the jury gave only one damage award.
The award was for breach of the Trust Deed Note
contract).

(a breach of

They then awarded $125,000 in punitive damages.
13

The award of $62,500 plus interest was on defendants'
first cause of action in the counterclaim.

No punitive damages

were sought for the breach of contract action nor could they be
lawfully allowed under the cases cited above.
In question 3 6 of the special interrogatories, the jury
awarded recovery on the face amount of the Trust Deed Note plus
interest. With respect to the claims of defendants to entitlement
to general or compensatory damages for "costs spent after the sale"
and "extras not paid for" the jury awarded $0 in each category.
These two categories were the "general" or "compensatory"
damages, an award of which is an absolute prerequisite under the
statute and case law before a punitive damage award may stand.
Therefore, it is manifest that under the statute and
cases cited herein, the punitive damage award of $125,000 must
fail.
In addition to the statutory and case law requirement of
general damages, before punitives may be awarded, the statute also
requires a finding that the act for which punitive damages are
awarded be either:

(a) willful and malicious; (b) intentionally

fraudulent; or (c) manifest a knowing and reckless indifference
toward and disregard of the rights of others.
This requires two things to occur before an award can
stand:
14

1.

A finding of one of the above elements by the jury.

2.

Such finding must be based upon instructions to the
jury defining the said elements and informing the
jury of their necessity before punitives may be
awarded.

Since neither instructions nor a finding exist, the award
cannot stand.
Plaintiffs herein are entitled as a matter of law to have
the punitive damage award stricken.
POINT II
AS A MATTER OF LAW, DEFENDANTS DALE THURGOOD AND DEL
BARTEL HAVE NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE TRUST DEED
AND NOTE AND NO LEGAL RIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO FORECLOSE
THE SAME. THE JURY'S VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE
TO VACATE THE AWARD
The evidence in the case clearly shows that defendants
Dale Thurgood and Del Bartel assigned all right, title and interest
they possessed in the Trust Deed and Note for $62,500 to Utah Title
(Exhibits 11,12 & 13; Tr. pp. 622,1608-10, 1615, 1617.)
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other
than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real
property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in
writing subscribed by the party creating,
15

granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
To paraphrase, "no estate or interest in real property . . .
shall be . . - assigned

. . . otherwise than . . .

in writing

subscribed by the party . . . assigning . . . the same. . . . n
Therefore, by statute, the only way Thurgood and Bartel
could ever again obtain an interest in the Trust Deed and Note
(Exhibits

11 and

13) after having

assigned

away

all of their

interest therein (Exhibit 12) would be by written assignment back
from Utah Title.

Defendants testified they never received back

such an assignment.

(Tr. p. 1609-10.)

An oral assignment is impossible under Utah Code Ann. §
25-5-1.

The jury did not and could not, on the evidence, make a

finding that the defendants owned the Trust Deed and Note.
The record in this case is devoid of any evidence to
support a claim of interest of defendants in the Trust Deed Note.
By statute (25-5-1) the only method by which they could obtain any
interest is a written assignment.

Defendants testified the trust

deed had been sent back to them

(Tr. p. 1615) but they never

received back the note upon which their claim is based.

(See,

Affidavit of Bradley C. Harr.) (Original note still held by Utah
Title.)

16

Therefore, as a matter of law, Utah Title owns the Trust
Deed and Note and the defendants herein have no right title or
interest therein and lack standing to foreclose the same.

(See,

Affidavit of Robert D. Schmidt.)
The court's denial of the plaintiffs' motion was based
upon the erroneous assumption there was testimony that the note and
trust deed had been assigned back to defendants.
1635.)

This is not true.

assignment back.

(See, Tr. p.

Thurgood testified there had been no

(Tr. p. 1609-10.)

The court's ruling, having

been based upon a misunderstanding of the testimony, should now be
reversed.
Therefore, the court should dismiss count one of the
counterclaim and vacate the jury's award thereunder, there being no
evidence upon which such award can legally be based.
POINT III
UTAH CODE ANN. S 42-2-10 PRECLUDES DEFENDANTS FROM
MAINTAINING THEIR COUNTERCLAIM AND JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS APPROPRIATE TO
DISMISS THEIR COUNTERCLAIM
In the present case, plaintiffs assert that Utah Code
Ann. § 42-2-10 precludes suit herein by the Cascade defendants .on
their counterclaims.

The language of the statute is clear.

The

testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne, the Director of the Division of
Corporations

and

Commercial

Code
17

was

clear.

He

stated

that

defendants Del Bartel, Lee Bartel and Dale Thurgood were not and
had not at any previous time ever legally complied with the filing
requirements of Section 42-2-5 and, therefore, the penalty provided
in Section 42-2-10 was applicable.
The

court

ruled

that

as

a

factual

matter,

Cascade

defendants had made a good faith attempt to comply by attempting to
file even though they

could

not

legally

file under the names

Cascade Construction or Cascade Enterprises.
The stated basis for the court's ruling was good faith
compliance by defendants.

However, it can hardly be considered

good faith compliance to not comply for over five years and then
rush to file after a motion to dismiss has been filed based upon
the

previous

conduct

of

ignoring

the

requirement.

If

the

defendants were acting in good faith, they would have filed when
they went into business and not waited until June 14, 1990 after
the motion to dismiss was submitted to the court.

Defendants

admitted that when they filed they were told it would take 48-72
hours to clear the name.

(Tr. p. 1255.)

This period is to allow

the state to make sure the name is not already owned by someone
else.

Having been so informed, they cannot claim in good faith

they relied upon the filing or were damaged when it was determined
they could not legally use the names filed for which had been
legally registered to another.

18

Plaintiffs respectfully urge that such ruling is
erroneous for the following reasons:
The statute makes no provision for "good faith" attempts
to comply.

There is no case law to support such an exception.

The

statute is mandatory and provides for filing an assumed name at the
time one commences business (Section 42-2-5).

(Emphasis added.)

The risk one runs if one fails to comply with Section 42-2-5 at the
time one commences business is that at some future date the chosen
fictitious name will not be available for use.
occurred in this case.)
defendants herein.

(The event which

That is the contingency which has befallen

For six years they ignored the mandate of

Section 42-2-5 and then, when faced with the penalty of Section 422-10, they found themselves unable to comply legally as the names
were registered to another.
The crucial question involved is whether this court has
the power to judicially create a "good faith" exception to the
filing requirement of Section 42-2-5 and the ensuing penalty for

non-compliance found in Section 42-2-10•
It is a clearly accepted principle of law that a court
has no power to enlarge the scope of a statute nor to amend it by
judicial

interpretation.

frafrrfgaeg

v.

Kanfefla

Sfcata

Blerhway

Commission, 199 Kan. 175, 428 P.2d 814 (1967); Anderson v. Citv of
Seattle, 78 Wash.2d 201, 471 P.2d 87 (1970).
19

As observed by the

Utah

Court of Appeals, "The court's primary

construing

legislation

legislature.11

responsibility

in

is to give effect to the intent of the

State v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987).

See, Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah
1980); Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah
1982).

The court's primary responsibility is to give effect to the

legislature's intent.
3

(Utah 1984).

American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1,

.See, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d

1314

(Utah

1983); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977).
The
clear.

legislative

intent of

There is no equivocation.

Section

42-2-5 et seq.

is

The mandate is "File your dba

before you do business or run the risk of not being able to use the
courts of this state until you can legally comply with Section 422-5."

If

through

negligence

or

compliance, no suit can be maintained.

inadvertence

there

is

no

There is no basis for being

allowed to sue merely because you tried.
Nowhere is there any statutory language regarding excuses
for not filing or relating to good faith attempts to comply.
language is clear.

The

Comply or you are barred from using state

courts.
There

is

no

evidence

compliance with Section 4 2-2-5.

in

the

record

showing

legal

The testimony of Mr. Van Alstyne

is unequivocal that there was no compliance by the defendants
20

herein with the provision of the statute and that defendants did
not legally file under the name Cascade Construction Company or
Cascade Enterprises.

(See, Tr. pp. 1512, 1517.)

Therefore, the

only avenue open to the court is to follow the legislative mandate
of Section 42-2-10 and dismiss the counterclaims.

Defendants must

bear the burden of their longstanding failure to comply with the
statutory mandate of Section 42-2-5.
POINT IV
THE DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY AND NEGLIGENCE
IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER THE EVIDENCE AND THIS COURT
SHOULD GRANT AN APPROPRIATE ADDITUR OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES
Rule

59(a)(5)

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) [A] new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes. . .
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages,
appearing to have been given under the
influence or passion or prejudice.
While granting a new trial is one remedy for inadequate
damages, the Utah Supreme Court has held that implicit within the
authority of the Court to grant a new trial is the power to grant
an additur to the verdict.

In Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327

P.2d 826, 828 (1958), the Court stated:
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There is implicit within the authority of the
court to grant a new trial on the statutory
ground of "excessive or inadequate damages"
the power to order a new trial conditionally;
that is, to order that a new trial be granted
unless the party adversely affected by the
order agrees to a remittitur or an additur of
the damages to an amount within proper limits
as viewed by the court.
The Court explained that this process of modifying the
verdict to bring it within the evidence is reserved for situations
where the verdict is outside the limits of what appears justifiable
under the evidence to such an extent that the verdict should not be
permitted to stand.

Id. at 8 29.

In Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670, 671
(1953),

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

explained

the

standard

in

determining whether to grant an additur or new trial as follows:
If inadequacy or excessiveness of the verdict
presents a situation that such inadequacy or
excessiveness shows a disregard by the jury of
the evidence or the instructions of the court
as to the law applicable to the case as to
satisfy the court that the verdict was
rendered under such disregard or misapprehension of the evidence or influence of
passion or prejudice, then the court may
exercise its discretion in the interest of
justice and grant a new trial.
The Court further clarified this standard in Wellman v.
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P. 2d 701

(Utah) by stating that an

additur or new trial is warranted where "it seems clear that the
jury has misapplied or failed to take into account proven facts; or
22

misunderstood

or disregarded the law; or made findings clearly

against the weight of the evidence."
The plaintiff

Id. at 3 54.

acknowledges

that

it

is generally

prerogative of the jury to make the determination
Jensen v. Ekins, 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978).

the

of damages.

Where, however, the

standards listed above have been satisfied, the trial court can and
should step in and exercise its prerogative to bring the verdict
within the limits of the evidence.

Such is the case here.

This is not a case where the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with the amount of a general verdict and requests an additur.
is a case where the jury rendered a special verdict.

This

The damage

award of that verdict is inconsistent with the special verdicts
rendered by that same jury.
The
warranty

jury

found

the

defendants

that the building would

breached

the

be built as required

Uniform Building Code (Question No. 4(a)).

recovery

for

all

by the

The court found as a

matter of- law, the masonry was negligently installed.
measure of damages

implied

The proper

is cost of repair of the code defects and
damages

proximately

caused

by

the

defective

construction.
Exhibits 205, 206, 207 and 208 and the master's report
establish code violations needing repair.

Defendants offered no

proof at trial that any specific code violations set forth in
23

Exhibits 205, 206, 207 or 208 had been repaired and the defects in
the master's report were extant.

While there was evidence that

some "repairs" had been made, no evidence was produced to show what
repairs were made, by whom, or that the repairs corrected any
specific defect.
Bill Karren testified and gave a bid to fix the existing
code defects.

The defects needing repairs were categorized as

follows:
a)

Masonry;

b)

Roof and floor;

c)

Trusses;

d)

Heating and plumbing;

e)

Electrical;

f)

Parking lot;

g)

West stair;

h)

architectural; and

-i)

miscellaneous.

Bill Karren testified to the cost of repairs in each
category,

(Tr. pp. 842-845.)

Defendants offered no contradictory

or rebuttal testimony to show either:
a)

The repairs could actually be competently completed
at a lesser charge; or

b)

Any specific repair was not needed.
24

Therefore, the only competent evidence before the jury on
cost of repair was that of Mr. Karren.
Salt

Lake

County

ordered

plaintiffs

to

vacate

the

building because of structural defects affecting the safety of the
building.

(Tr. pp. 63-67, 92, 109-10.)

building because of the court order.

Plaintiffs vacated the

(Tr. p. 693.)

No evidence

was produced that there was any other reason plaintiffs vacated the
building. The costs to DeBry of vacating the building and renting
alternate space was $351,604.20.

(Tr. p. 6981; see Exhibit 245.)

Defendants offered no evidence to dispute the said costs nor was
evidence offered to dispute the fact that the structural defects
shown by the master's report created the safety problems.

Carl

Eriksson testified the masonry was one of the reasons for the
eviction.

(Tr. p. 66.)

Absent the structural problems shown by

the master's report, eviction would not have been pursued.
67.)

(Tr. p.

No~ evidence was adduced to refute the testimony of Carl

Eriksson that the masonry problems
responsible for the eviction.
evidence

from which

the

jury

(structural problems) were

Therefore, there is no competent
could

conclude

other than the

structural problems caused by the defective masonry caused the
eviction of plaintiffs from the building and the resultant damages
of $351,604.20.
25

There is no basis in the evidence for the amounts listed
by the jury in answer to Question No. 18. Nor is there evidence in
the record from which the said amounts listed by the jury could
have been arrived at by mathematical calculation.
the numbers are random.

It is clear that

It is also clear, however, that the jury

found plaintiffs were entitled to recover costs of repairs for code
defects.
In Call v. Manti City Corporation, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(1990), the court was presented with a situation similar to the
case at bar.

The jury awarded damages in an amount significantly

less than that testified to by plaintiff's expert, and which amount
was not rebutted by other competent evidence.

In handling the

problem, the Court of Appeals stated:
It is true that Call's evidence regarding
damages was not entirely uniform.
However,
the evidence clearly
established
general
damages in an amount for exceeding what the
-jury awarded. Id. at 32.
Testimony was received at trial as to a high and a low on
what the damages for loss of profits could be.

Call's argument was

that the jury could not award less than the minimum amount of
damage shown by competent evidence at trial and that the trial
court had erred in not directing a verdict for at least the minimum
damage shown by the evidence.

The appeals court agreed and stated:
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While plausible views of the evidence might
have led to fixing a damage award at certain
other levels within this broad range, no
evidence of record, nor any disciplined view
of the evidence of record, would support an
award outside this range.
Call made timely
motions for a directed verdict, and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in the
amount shown by the most conservative view of
the evidence, $56,377.60. On appeal, although
it would settle for a new trial, Call
principally argues the court erred, given the
lack of any contrary
evidence,
in not
directing a verdict or judgment in this
minimal amount and that we should remand with
instructions to do so.
A trial court's refusal to direct a verdict
will not be sustained when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
party who resisted the motion, reasonable
minds would necessarily accept the evidence
relied on by the moving party.
See, e.g. ,
White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1983).
Similarly, a refusal to enter a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict will be reversed
when the part so moving is entitled to the
judgment requested as a matter of law. See,
e.g. , Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah
1988) .
In this case, while reasonable minds could
differ on whether Call was entitled to more,
the evidence established
it was clearly
entitled to judgment in at least the amount of
$56,377.60. Upon proper motions by Call, the
court erred in not directing a verdict or
granting judgment in that amount.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment which was
entered on the jury's verdict and remand with
instructions
to
enter
judgment
in
the
principal amount of $56,377.60. Id. at 33.
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When a verdict is supported by competent evidence, the
court usually leaves it as it is.

When, however, there is no

evidence to support an award, the court may take action to conform
the award to the evidence.

gee, Weber Basin Water Conservancy

District v. Skeen, supra.
An additur is a proper method of treating a situation
where inadequate damages are awarded.

See, Bodon v. Suhrmann,

supra.
In the present case, the Masters 1 panel found the cost of
masonry repairs to be $161,885. Mr. Bill Karren testified the cost
of repair would be $161,885.
trial.

No contrary evidence was admitted at

As a minimum, the masonry repair costs should be increased

from $30,800 to $161,885.

Secondly, electrical repairs were $10,648 according to
Bill Karren.

No contrary evidence was admitted.

The electrical

award should be increased from $0 to $10,648.
Additionally, the following awards should be increased
since no contrary evidence was produced at trial.
Roof and Floor Repairs
Truss Repairs
Heating and Plumbing
West Exit Stairs
Architectural Costs
Miscellaneous Items
TOTAL COST OF ALL REPAIRS
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$31,514
10,549
24,200
1,470
37,268
n f 816
$333,515

In addition, the moving and alternate space leasing costs
were established at $351,604.20. No evidence to refute this amount
was given and so the award should be increased to cover this damage
which was undeniably shown to result from the masonry defects upon
which judgment was directed for plaintiffs.
POINT V
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE A NEW TRIAL
ON NEGLIGENCE, WARRANTY AND ON DAMAGES FOR
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF WARRANTY
The court ruled at trial and instructed the jury that
defendants were negligent in constructing the building, yet the
jury answered Question No. 1 that defendants were not negligent in
constructing the building.
The jury answered question no. 4 "yes" thereby finding,
of

necessity,

that

the

building

was

constructed

with

violations (including of necessity the masonry defects).

code
Having

thus ruled, and given the court's instruction that defendants were
negligent in construction of the masonry, there is no logical basis
for finding that the workmanship warranties were not breached.
Also, there is no basis for the "no" answer to question no. 1.
Also, the court ruled and defendants stipulated to a breach of
workmanship warranty.

(Tr. p. 164 0.)
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The court having
result

of

defendants

ruled on the masonry defects

stipulation

to

be

bound

(as a

thereby)

and

defendants having so stipulated, there is no basis for finding
there was no breach of warranties of occupancy and habitability.
The only way the jury could have answered "no", as it
did, on question nos. 1, 4(b) and 4(e) would be to totally ignore
the court's instructions and act out of prejudice or passion.
Failure of the jury to follow the instructions of the
court on the law is sufficient basis for granting a new trial.
Efco Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615
(1966); Matter of Acquisition of Property by Eminant Domain, 236
Kan. 417, 690 P.2d 1375 (1984); Cole v. Gerhart, 5 Ariz. App. 24,
423 P.2d 100 (1967); Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683
(1978); Salvail v. Great Northern Rv Co., 473 P.2d

549

(Mont.

1970); Price v. Sinnot, 85 Nev. 600, 460 P.2d 837 (1969) affd. 90
Nev. 5, 517 P.2d 1006 (1974).
It has

also

been

held

that

where

the

answers are inconsistent, a new trial is justified.

interrogatory
Van Cleve v.

Setts, 16 Wash. App. 748, 559 P.2d 1006 (1977).
A new trial is also proper where there is insufficient
evidence to support the jury verdict.

Efco Distributing, Inc. v.

Perrin, supra; Villeaas v. Brvson, 16 Ariz. App. 456, 494 P.2d 61
(1972) .
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The whole purpose of a new trial is to correct errors
made at the trial.

In the present case, the jury made obvious

errors in not following the court's instruction on negligence and
warranty and in not answering Questions No. 2 & 3.

There are

obvious errors and failures to follow the evidence in the jury's
answers to Question No. 18.
As the court observed in Efco Distributing, Inc. v.
Perrin, supra:
If is clearly appears that there has been a
miscarriage of justice because the jury has
refused to accept credible, uncontradicted
evidence where there is no rational basis for
rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that
the jury has acted under a misconception of
proven facts, or has misapplied or disregarded
the law, or where it appears that the verdict
was the result of passion and prejudice, it is
both the prerogative and the duty of the court
to set aside the verdict and grant a new
trial.
In the present case, the findings of the jury do not
follow the evidence.

In the event the court does not grant the

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiffs' motion
for judgment and the additur motion, a new trial should be granted
on defendants' liability and on the damages resulting therefrom.
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CONCLUSION
The jury's answers to the special verdict are in conflict
and not justified under the evidence in the case and should not be
allowed to stand.

This is especially true of the failure to rule

on the proximate cause issue on negligence and damages therefore.
The evidence at trial argues conclusively for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and an additur as requested herein, or
in the alternative, a new trial for plaintiffs as to the negligence
issues and damages on negligence and warranty.
DATED this

l£

day of October, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiffs

EDWARD T. WELLS
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Hand-Delivered to Court, March, 1988

Meetings - Engineers, Salt Lake County, plancheck,
as-builts, permits, inspections, etc.
General Supervision - Subs
Fees - Engineering, specs, as^builts, permit

$ 1,500.00
950.00
7,000.00

Materials - Structural steel tube and plate, metal
window framing, toilet partitions, grab bars,
door closers, smoke seal, sheetrock, oak
framing, studs, bolts, epoxy, concrete,
paint, door hardware
7,350.95
Labor
Structural and related
$3,552.00
Toilet partitions, door closers,
smoke seal
1,525.00
Framing, wall repair
900.00
Metal window framing
1,200.00
Outside stair repair
875.00
Tenting lighting
1,012.50
General repair - grid blocking,
piping, etc.
1,625.00
Cleanup
95.00
Delivery
133.63
10,918.13
$27,719.81
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A.

It is planned that way, yes.

They had original

plans on that job.
3

MR. WELLS:

May I have a moment, your Honor?

4

THE COURT:

You may.

5

(A 1Oriel pause in the proceedings.)

6

MR. WELLS:

That's all I have.

7

THE COURT:

Redirect?

8

MR. DEL BARTEL:

9

THE COURT:

None, your Honor.

You may step down.

Have a nice day.

10

Any objection to the witness being excused?

11

MR. WELLS:

We have none.

12

THE COURT:

Call your next witness.

13

MR. DEL BARTEL:

14

We would call Dale Thurgood to the

stand.
THE COURT:

15

You have been previously sworn.
DALE THURGOOD,

16
17

called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendants, being

18

previously sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION

19
20
21

BY MR. DEL BARTEL:
Q.

Mr. Thurgood, you previously testified that Cascade

22

reentered the building to make repairs in the fall of 1987.

23

What prompted that action?

24
25

A.

There was a hearing held in this courtroom, in which

all of the parties to the suit at that time agreed that it
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would be a wise idea to go in and try and fix wnatever alleged
problems there were, in order to mitigate the litigation.
3
4

Q.

Did a scheduling and management order develop from

that hearing?

5

A.

Yes, it did.

6

Q.

I show you what has been labeledi as Exhibit AAA.

7
8
9
10
11
12

Do

you recognize that document?
A.

This is a copy of the scheduling order which was

drafted by the plaintiffs1 attorney, Dale Gardiner, in August
of 1987.
Q.

Did you review that document aft er it had been

prepared'?

13

A.

Yes, I did.

14

Q.

Did you sign it?

15

A.

Yes, I did.

16

Q.

Did you sign a specific addendum at that time to it,

17
18

as well as the» original signing?
A.

I affixed my signature to it, subject to the

19

attached addendum which we sent with it when we signed the

20

original.

21

Q.

Did you proceed to take all the steps to reenter the

22

building and correct cited defects based upon that scheduling

23

order?

24

A.

Yes, we did.

25

Q.

Did you incur substantial costs as a result of that
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1

document?

2

A.

Yes, sir.

3

Q.

I would like to refer you to paragraph 7 of the

4

initial document, of the order itself.

5

the jury.

6

A.

Would you read that to

"Thereafter, Cascade defendants and their

7

subcontractors, agents and employees shall have access to the

8

building up tnrough November 2, 1987, for the purpose of

9

correcting the alleged defects and code violations set forth

10

in the plaintiffs' affidavits for summary judgment heard by

11

the Court on July 20, 1987.

12

by Kenneth Karren, Jr., Niels Valentiner, Ted Wilson, Frank

13

Liebrock.

14

not further encumber the building.

15

liability insurance for their workers.

16

a copy of this order to all subcontractors who work on the

17

property."

18

Q.

Those affidavits were submitted

In carrying out their work, Cascade defendants will
They will provide
Cascade shall provide

Were those the same affidavits that Mr. Wells

19

referred to earlier in trial as the documents that he insisted

20

that we had reviewed or relied upon?

21
22

A.

Those were the same affidavits Mr. Wells spent two

days grilling me

on.

23

Q.

Would you read paragraph 8 of the document.

24

A.

"Plaintiffs1 expert witnesses shall be --

25

plaintiffs' experts shall reasonably cooperate with Cascade
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the noon recess, remember the previous admonition of the
Court.

Do not discuss the case among yourselves, do not

permit anyone to discuss the case in your presence, do not
form nor express an opinion in this matter until it has been
submitted to you for your deliberation and your decision.
Have a nice lunch.

The Court will be in recess until 1:30.

(A lunch recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

The record will reflect the presence of

the jury, the alternate, counsel and the parties.

You may

proceed.
MR. WELLS:

Before we proceed, as your Honor will

recall, I indicated to you during the recess that Mr. Debry
had a personal matter that would necessitate his being absent
for an hour or two.

The Court has indicated there will be no

problem with that.
THE COURT:

The record will reflect that the absence

was noted to the Court in advance.
Q.

Mr. Thurgood, Mr. Wells previously contended that

you did not go out and hire new engineers when defect reports
began to flow from the Debrys.
MR. WELLS:
form of the question.

Why not?

Your Honor, I am going to object to the
The testimony was that the defect

reports came from engineers, not from the Debrys.
THE COURT:
Q.

Sustained.

Why didn't you go out and hire new engineers when
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1

you received the various defect reports that Mr. Debry showed

2

you here today?

3

A.

We had contractual obligations with all of our

4

subcontractors who had performed the work, which was being

5

alleged as defective, and felt that those subcontractors were

6

competent and certainly had the right to address those issues,

7

and we had a legal obligation to allow them to do so.

8

Q.

Did you subsequently contact those subcontractors?

9

A.

Yes, we did.

10

Q.

Why was there a delay between the time that you saw

11

the reports and that subcontractors or Cascade reentered the

12

building to address them?

13

A.

At the end of 1986 and into 1987, through about

14

August or September, we were locked off of that job, and it

15

was in September we finally received a court order, allowing

16

us to go into that building.

17

Q.

Isn't it true that even when we got —

when the

18

first court order was obtained to enter the building, that

19

Debrys still prevented that entering?

20

A.

That's true.

21

Q.

Did the subcontractors subsequently go back into the

22

building in 1987?

23

A.

Yes, they did.

24

Q.

Prior to their reentering the building, was a new

25

building permit obtained from the county?
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1
2
3
4

A.

We obtained a new building permit in November 1987,

prior to their being allowed to start any work.
Q.

Wasn't that permit based upon a new set of plans and

specifications?

5

A,

Yes, it was.

6

Q.

Wasn't it also based upon the report of David

7

Christensen, who is an engineer?

8

A.

His report was included with the new plans, yes.

9

Q.

And wasn't the reports of the plaintiffs, that were

10

presented here today —

11

the county?

12

A.

13

new plans

14

weren't they included and presented to

The county utilized those reports in going over the
—
MR. WELLS:

I am going to object, move to strike his

15

testifying as to what the county did.

16

any basis for that.

I don't think there is

17

THE COURT:

Sustained.

18

MR. WELLS:

May it be stricken?

19

THE COURT:

That portion that refers to matters that

20

are beyond the firsthand knowledge of the witness are

21

stricken.

22
23

Q.

Mr. Thurgood, did you meet with Carl Eriksson of the

county to review the plans and specifications?

24

A.

Yes, I did.

25

Q.

Did Mr. Eriksson show you reports that he received
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from the Debrys?
A.

Yes, he did.

Q.

Were those reports -- did they reflect essentially

the same items that were discussed here today?
MR. WELLS:

Objection, the reports are the best

evidence of what they reflected.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

A.

Yes, they did.

Q.

Isn't it true that the county issued a second

permit, and approved a second set of plans, based upon all
that input?
A.

They did.

Q.

Isn't it also true that the subcontractors reentered

the building, based upon all of the new information that was
presented to the county and approved?
A.

That's correct.

Q.

And isn't it also true that at each inspection that

was made on the building, after the subcontractors had
performed work again, and readdressed all those issues, that
the plaintiffs1 engineer was called prior to every inspection,
to allow him to enter onto the premises at the time of the
inspection?
A.

Yes.
MR. WELLS:

Objection, foundation.

May we have some

foundation?
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THE COURT:
Q.

Overruled.

It is a matter for redirect.

Do you know for a fact that plaintiffs1 engineers

were called prior to the county agreeing to make inspections
on that building?
A.

I was present or in the presence of county

inspectors when they called, at least Mr. Karren, and held the
inspections -- not Bill Karren, Jr., I believe his father

—

until he arrived, before those inspections were held.
Q.

Wasn't the building approved again by the county,

subject to a set of items that needed to be completed?
MR. WELLS:

Objection, calls for a conclusion.

THE COURT:

Overruled.

A.

Yes, it was.

Q.

Didn't this Court call upon the county to provide an

affidavit, outlining the items that needed to be completed in
the building, subsequent to those inspections?
A.

Yes, they did.

Q.

Was an affidavit subsequently provided?

A.

Carl Eriksson provided one to the Court.
MR. DEL BARTEL:
THE COURT:

Q.
Exhibit L.

Your Honor, if I may.

You may.

Mr. Thurgood, I will show you what is labeled
Is that the affidavit that Carl Eriksson, or a

copy of it, that Carl Eriksson provided to the Court?
A.

Yes, it is.
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1
2

Q.

In reviewing that document, what items needed to be

addressed for final occupancy to be given on the building?

3

MR. WELLS:

4

hasn't been admitted.

5'

unadmitted.

Objection, the document is hearsay.
It is improper to read a document

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. DEL BARTEL:

8

Sustained.
I ask that the document be

admitted.

9

MR. WELLS:

Objection, hearsay.

10

THE COURT:

What is the document?

11

(A brief pause in the proceedings.)

12

THE COURT:

13

(An off-the-record discussion at the bench.)

14

It

Q.

Approach the bench, please.

Were you informed by the county, after a series of

15

inspections had been made on the building, pursuant to going

16

in in 1987, what remained to be done?

17

A.

18

After

—

MR. WELLS:

Your Honor, it calls for a yes or a no.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

What remained to be done?

21

MR. WELLS:

Objection, hearsay.

22

THE COURT:

Overruled.

23

A.

After the last inspection, which I attended, was

24

held by the county, I was informed there were four items left

25

to be addressed before certificate of occupancy would be
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issued.
Q.

Do you recall those four items?

A.

Yes, I do.

Q.

And what are they?

A.

That either wire glass had to be installed in the

south side of the building, and a parapet wall installed on
the south side of the building, or, in the alternative, a
four-foot easement or purchase of property from the neighbor
on the south, that door coordinators had to be put on the two
sets of eight-foot doors in the building, and that a broken
truss had to be repaired.
Q.

To the best of your knowledge, right today, have

those items been resolved?
A.

Every one.

Q.

Are you aware of the plaintiffs submiting any other

documents to the county, citing any further defects?
A.

I don't know whether they have, or not.

believe so.

I may retract that.

I don't

They probably haven't sent

them a copy of the Master's report.
Q.

Mr. Thurgood, questions were given to you with

regard to Valley Mortgage making any extensions on the
construction loan on that building.

Your response was —

the

question was, were there any further extensions after October?
And you said yes.

Did you ever receive a document which

showed that Valley Mortgage was willing to extend that loan?
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
Central Division
In re
UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY,

Bankruptcy No. 88C-01188
Chapter 7

Debtor.
AMENDED NOTICE OP CLAIHS
Pursuant to the Order of the Court, given in open court
on May 20, 1994, Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry herewith provide
the following notice to Dale Thurgood and Del Bartel of the nature
of the claims presently being made by the DeBrys against the escrow
funds which the Trustee has available for distribution from the
Utah Title escrow.
1.

The monies held by the Trustee were escrowed at the

time of closing to pay amounts due to subcontractors and others who
had worked on the building at 4152 South 700 East, including
Cascade Construction Company.
2.
Electric.

The sum of $663.59- was payable in part to Zephyr

The DeBrys obtained a judgment against Zephyr Electric

for work not completed on the building at 4252 South 700 East.
Since the money held by the Trustee was to pay Zephyr, in part for

its uncompleted work, that money should be applied against the
Zephyr judgment (copy attached as Ex. A) .
3.

The sum

of $3,536.06 was allocated

to Cascade

Construction Company or Cascade Enterprises, partnerships of Mr.
Thurgood and Mr. Bartel.

As the general partner who sold the

building and built the building, the partners are responsible for
defalcations by subcontractors and the monies allocated to Cascade
should be applied to satisfy the judgment of Zephyr.
4*
Systems*

The sum of $5,400.00 was allocated to Building

The documents attached as Ex. B show that DeBrys paid

Building Systems and assumed the position of Building Systems and
are entitled to monies payable to Building Systems*
For the above reasons, the monies allocated to Zephyr
Electric, Building Systems and Cascade should be paid to the
DeBrys•
DATED this

P

j

day of June, 1994.
ROBERT J. DEBRY 4 ASSOCIATES

